Get help from the best in academic writing.

The Welfare Losses Of A Monopoly

Introduction ‘The main effects of monopoly are to misallocate resources, to reduce aggregate welfare, and to redistribute income in favour of monopolists.’ (Harberger, 1954: 2) It is for this reason that monopoly power is generally condemned by neoclassical economists. Super-normal profits generated in both short and long run are a function of supra competitive prices being charged. And although vast amounts of wealth accrue to monopolists in an economy, such market failures remain unsolved. The objective of this paper is to review and critique the various attempts at measuring the ‘Deadweight Loss’ and examine alternative views on monopolistic behaviour. Monopoly The Monopolist sets its price and allows the market to determine the quantity it will demand: ‘Law of One Price.’ Where a firm in perfect competition produces output at a price equal to its marginal cost [1] , the Monopolist produces where the marginal cost of each unit equals its marginal revenue. This results in a constrained level of output below that which would be supplied under competitive conditions, thus representing the inefficiency of the operation. Perfectly competitive markets are in this way viewed as being productively efficient since in the long run no firm could survive without producing at the lowest point on its average cost curve. In contrast, monopolists restrict output below the technically most productive level in order to raise price. (O’Toole, 2008) Clarke and Davies (1982) show that the extent to which price exceeds marginal cost can be related to the level of market concentration, as measured by the Lerner index. Since the demand curve is downward sloping, < 0, the monopolist must reduce its price in order to increase output (sales). Marginal revenue is the price at which the monopolist can sell the marginal unit, reduced by a loss of revenue on output that could have been sold at a higher price. being the elasticity of demand, which is in tandem with the fact that is negative. Lerner’s (1934) index of market power: gives us the output decision of the monopolist: The ‘Deadweight Loss’ welfare triangle shows the lost (Marshallian) consumer and producer surplus, while rectangle L represents a transfer of income from the consumer to the Monopolist. Such a reallocation is said to be Pareto inefficient [2] , and it is this welfare loss associated with Monopolistic behaviour that exposes it to such flak on the economic and political front. Deadweight Loss, however, places producers and consumers on the same plane, whereas the income transfer from consumers to producers is not considered a social welfare loss because it is offset by monopoly profits which accrue to owners of the monopoly firm. (Martin, 1994) Estimating the Welfare Triangle ‘If this estimate is correct, economists might serve a more useful purpose of they fought fires or termites instead of monopoly.’ (Stigler: 1956: 34) The premier estimate of Deadweight Loss is attributed to the pioneering work of Arnold Harberger (1954) at the University of Chicago. The American manufacturing industry was examined over the period 1924-1928, using a sample of 2,046 corporations which account for 45% of the manufacturing industry. The time frame was selected mainly for its stable prices and resemblance to long run equilibrium. It is assumed that long run average costs exhibit constant returns to scale (which aids determination of marginal costs) and in equilibrium, all firms are operating on their long run cost curves, these cost curves yield the firm an equal return on its invested capital, and all markets are cleared. While a plausible image of ideal resource allocation, it may be less observable in the real world – but does allow for detecting any misallocation by simply observing the rates of return on capital. The dataset used consisted of rates of total profit to total capital for seventy-three manufacturing industries, with total capital defined as ‘book capital plus bonded indebtedness’ and total profit defined as ‘book profit plus interest on the indebtedness.’ (Harberger: 1954: 79) The excess profits are expressed as the difference between what would have been attained if that firm had achieved the average rate of profit for that industry. To eliminate these excesses, the reallocation of resources (defined as labour, capital and materials supplied by other industries) is largely dependent on the elasticity of demand facing each industry in question, which is assumed to be quite low or close to unity at the highest. This allows the amount of excess profit to measure the quantity of resources required to bring a firm’s profit rate toward the average. The effect of an industry expanding output (to the competitive ‘average profit’ level) may cause another industry supplying the former industry to expand its output. However, where some industries under-produce and others overproduce before the reallocation, a counter effect is assumed to occur. The result is that misallocation of resources across the manufacturing industry could have been eliminated by a transfer of 4% of resources of the manufacturing industry or 1.5% of the economy’s total resources. Further, the total improvement in consumer welfare is estimated at $26.5 million; this translates into $59 million for the whole economy – ‘less than one tenth of one percent of national income [3] .’ (Harberger: 1954: 82) This estimate was confirmed in a later study by Schwartzman (1960). In 1954 dollars, this welfare gain amounted to $1.50 for every man, woman and child in the United States. Algebraically, Harberger’s method was a modification of the basic triangle formula: Where since, that is, in perfect competition price equals cost (AC/MC assumed constant). return on sales. Harberger assumed that , believing that elasticities would be fairly low for manufacturing industries. Harberger’s estimation of Deadweight Loss is not without its flaws; the assumption of constant costs is improbable over time when we factor in the effects of inflation on costs of production. The estimated consumer welfare would hence be even less than 1% of GDP. When patents and goodwill are factored out of capitalised profit, the resource transfer would rise to 1.75%, and the welfare loss due to resource misallocation would work out at $81 million. (Harberger, 1954) Further, the sample included high profit firms resulting in an average profit rate of 10.4% over 8% in the manufacturing industry as a whole. A further issue with industry data is that the profits of firms exercising market power are offset by the losses of firms making losses because of inefficiencies. These firms are in short run disequilibrium due to inefficiently high costs; their losses are a cost to society but not because they have market power. The assumption of price elasticity equalling 1 generated much debate; where elasticity is relatively high, incremental price increases cause quantities demanded to fall substantially, hence deadweight loss will be relatively high. In contrast, low elasticity (inelastic demand) means very light sensitivity to price increases – deadweight loss will therefore be quite small. In addition, unit elasticity of demand implies marginal revenue equal to zero, and since marginal costs are unlikely to be zero, this is at odds with fundamental profit maximization. (Ferguson et al, 1994) As a final note, one could suggest that being associated with the Chicago School, Harberger’s work may have been slightly biased in its attempt to calculate monopoly welfare losses. Rent Seeking: Beyond Harberger’s Triangle ‘The Gods help those who help themselves.’ AESOP It is argued that the Monopolist’s supernormal profits do not just represent a transfer of income from consumer to producer, as rent seeking activities dissipate these profits over time. (O’Toole, 2008) The premise of rent seeking is generally associated with Tullock (1967) who argues that the very opportunity of monopoly profits will attract huge resources into efforts to obtain that monopoly position, which in turn represents an opportunity cost of such resources and a social cost to society. Tullock uses the analogy of theft to illustrate squandering of resources: the exchange of wealth from victim to thief bears no social cost upon society; it merely alters the distribution of wealth. However, the thief will invest resources to obtain this wealth: the very act of rent seeking. At the same time, potential victims invest resources in locks and paraphernalia to avert the possibility of crime, and it is this expenditure of resources by both parties which represents the social loss. In this vein, Posner (1975) advocates that the deadweight loss triangle underestimates the true losses associated with monopoly. His model incorporates the deadweight loss as well as losses inherent in trying to obtain a monopoly position [4] . Assumptions include: Cost of obtaining a monopoly is exactly equal to the expected profit of being a monopolist. Long run supply of all inputs is elastic: no rent included in their supply price Costs incurred in obtaining a monopoly have no socially valuable by products (for example, advertising expenditures) Total social costs of Monopoly are D L; since and This can also be expressed in terms of price elasticity of demand: The issue from here on is assuming the correct values in applying the formulae. Continuing with Harberger’s estimate of D = 0.1% of GNP, Posner found L = 3.3%, generating a total social cost of monopoly at 3.4% of GNP. (1975) Cowling and Mueller Study Just as Harberger adhered to the neoclassical judgement of monopoly, the Cowling and Mueller (1978) study is more theoretically robust. Data on price-cost margins collected at the firm level was used in estimating price elasticity of demand, and thereby the competitive rates of return and the level of monopoly profit. The deadweight loss was then estimated at half of monopoly profit (area L in diagram). Cowling and Mueller then extend this formula to account for rent seeking – expenditures unrelated to production costs, for example advertising. Advertising then, leads to further increases in price and shrinkage of quantity: This is can be extended further if advertising is considered a social cost: Furthermore, to account for wasteful expenditure to maintain a monopoly position,which Cowling and Mueller denote as after tax supernormal profits [5] Using the final expression above, the authors estimated total welfare loss as a result of monopoly at 13.14% of gross corporate product for the USA (734 firms over 1963-66) and 7.2% for the UK (103 firms over 1968-9). When reverting back to Harberger’s approach, Cowling and Mueller estimate total welfare loss at 3.96% and 3.86% for the USA and UK over the respective sample periods. According to Reid (1989), this study provides a suitable vehicle for illustrating the practical consequences of taking a structure-conduct-performance approach to monopoly, as distinct from an Austrian approach. At the very core of the Cowling and Mueller approach is the conformity with neoclassical analysis which advocates that monopoly possesses no socially beneficial attributes. However, costs outside those incurred in production cannot be sidelined as wasteful; advertising transmits information to all market participants, and the assumption of perfect information is crucial to the operation of a perfectly competitive market. The conclusion to be drawn much of this empirical analysis is that the existence of monopoly exhibits an insubstantial deadweight loss on society. Such welfare losses are likely to increase in the presence of rent seeking activities and wasteful expenditures in maintaining a monopoly. On the aggregate, total welfare loss is just the sum of welfare losses in each market, but this gives rise to the tentative issue of market definition and whether to aggregate by industry. Siegfried and Tiemann (1974), whose estimate of welfare loss in 1963 amounted to just 0.07%, estimated large losses in plastics, petroleum and automobiles industries; but industries rarely contain the same group of firms as markets. And as Harberger (1954) is criticised for, focusing analysis on large firms (assumed monopolists) poses the problem of these companies competing in several markets due to multi product chains. (Ferguson et al, 1994). On the other side of the coin rests the income redistribution effects of monopolistic competition. Whether area L in the diagram, being the transfer of income from consumers to producers, is socially acceptable varies across countries. In Europe, it is argued that the EU Competition Authority try to maximise consumer surplus rather than both consumer and producer surplus (George and Jacquemin, 1990). This is visible by looking at a stream of cases; the Ryanair v. the Commission (2006), Mastercard’s interchange fees case (2006), Wanadoo Interactive v. the Commission (2002) and Volkswagen v. the Commission (1998). US Antitrust Policy, on the other hand, strives to prevent trade restraints and monopolistic behaviour, in particular price discrimination and mergers which heavily alter market share. It is interesting to look at the distributional impact of market power; in a study by Comanaor and Smiley (1975) over the period 1890-1962 estimated that 0.27% of households in the US in 1962 controlled some 18.5% of all household wealth. The authors suggest that in the absence of this market power, these households may only control between 3-10% of household wealth (1975). Furthermore, the poorest households (28.25%) held a negative net worth (i.e. debts exceeded assets) and in the absence of income transfers owing to monopolistic behaviour, their net worth would be at least 1.39%. (Comanor and Smiley, 1975). This puts a more harsh face on monopoly; being unable to purchase the infra-marginal unit of a good at the competitive price aggregates to widen the inequality gap between rich and poor. Alternative: no orange juice at all? Monopoly excess profits often act as a short term reward necessary for sustaining the competitive process in the long term. Firms that enter the process of creative destruction that underlies the competitive process are often motivated by the possibility of being a monopolist, albeit only temporarily. The monopolistic market structure is more conducive to the pursuit of research and development innovation which requires significant levels of up front and risky investments, which competitive firms do not have the available retained earnings for. (O’Toole, 2008) Littlechild (1981) asserts that it is irrelevant to compare monopoly with perfect competition on the grounds that in the absence of monopoly, the product is often not provided, which represents a greater social loss. With this idea of a competitive process in mind, we can reinterpret Fig. 1 (diagram above) to analyse the behaviour of an entrepreneur who discovers a new product before the rest of the market realises its potential. Assume he charges a monopoly price P, since for the moment he is the sole seller. It is true that he is restricting output compared to what he could produce, or compared to what would be produced if all his rivals shared his own insight. But they do not share his insight; this is not the relevant alternative. For the time being the relevant alternative to his action is no product at all. It would therefore be inappropriate to characterise his action as generating a social loss given by the welfare triangle A. On the contrary, his action generates a social gain given by his own entrepreneurial profit plus the consumer surplus. (Littlechild: 1981: 358) Do Microsoft and Apple products have substitutable counterparts? And as other entrepreneurs enter this market, society will gain further as profit is eroded and transferred to consumer surplus by way of falling prices and expanding output. In this respect, we could view monopoly as a mechanism which fulfils a yet unfulfilled demand, restricting output in the early days of evolution and eventually transforming into a competitive market. Littlechild criticises Cowling and Mueller (1978) in their emphasis on long run equilibrium, deeming it inappropriate as it ignores profit arising from uncertainty and innovation. (1981) In addition, Littlechild asserts that the Harberger framework has its nature misinterpreted in relation to its extent, duration, costs and origins. (1981) It is a rarity that any monopolist is in long run equilibrium when there is an ongoing threat of new entrants and potential competition. Geroski (1991) found that in the UK over the period 1974-79 an average of 50 new firms per year entered each of the 87 three digit manufacturing industries in the study. It is hence implausible to assume output and prices remain constant in the long run. Finally, Littlechild (1981) believes that the Cowling-Mueller study over states welfare losses by not accounting for price discrimination, discounts and multi part tariffs and that post tax profits overstate the socially wasteful costs of obtaining a monopoly, as the initial resource owners will receive some monopoly rents. It can thus be argued that Littlechild takes the Austrian emphasis on competition as a process, by rejecting the neoclassical long run equilibrium framework for analysing welfare losses due to monopoly, pointing to variation in rates of return within industries as evidence of disequilibrium. (Reid, 1989) Public policy in the Littlechild (1981) tradition would seek to erode barriers to entry, which in itself would dissipate welfare losses. Cases against monopoly are often woolly; Ferguson et al (1994) illustrates a situation where the monopolist’s cost structure is lower than that of the perfectly competitive firm and abnormal profits are a function of these lower costs of production [6] , which only the monopolist can attain through barriers to entry. Examples would include access to restricted technologies which could spur innovative production processes, often achieved through the Monopolists own research and development. These resource savings in the monopoly sector permit increased output elsewhere, and if this productive gain outweighs the DWL, there will be an overall improvement in society’s welfare. Needham (1978) showed empirically that these cost savings need not be that substantial for productive efficiency to offset the allocative loss: a price 20% above the competitive level requires only a cost saving of 4% when. On the contrary, the monopolist’s costs may be higher than the equivalent competitive firm’s costs, simply because the monopolist can afford to be at least somewhat inefficient. Liebenstein (1966) is credited with the idea of ‘X-inefficiency’: the monopolist is not minimising costs due to unquantifiable factors such as lack of internal motivation or lower productivity of employees due to the absent competitive pressure. Likewise, market power may be associated with inflated costs rather than inflated profits: suppliers may squeeze the monopolist for higher prices in accordance with his means. Deadweight loss may be underestimated if costs are not kept to a minimum and we have no guarantee that every firm with market power is producing at the most efficient point on their production possibilities frontier. Chicago School economist Harold Demetz suggests that high profits may not be a signal of market power, since the firm with lowest costs will tend to expand in size and market share over time, ensuring an efficient form of market leadership. (1973) Despite vast horizontal and vertical integration, the success of Wal-Mart can largely be attributed to its efficiency and resulting lower prices, paving the way to a near monopoly position in supermarket chains. Recognition of these beneficial effects questions the traditional neoclassical argument against monopoly. Areas such as proposed efficiencies and cost savings unravel great difficulties for policymakers and regulators alike. In its analysis of the proposed takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair (2006), the EU Commission found efficiencies from the merger to be insufficient to offset the potential price increases [7] . Solution to Monopoly Loeb and Magat (1979) outline a regulatory mechanism whereby the Government subsidises the consumer surplus on every unit sold conditional on the Monopolist charging the competitive price (that is, equal to marginal cost). The proposal is quite simple: allow the Monopolist (‘utility’) to choose its price and the regulator will subsidise the utility on a per unit basis equal to consumer surplus at the selected price. If reductions in cost are achieved, then additional profits accrue to the utility. This acts as an incentive to innovate if cost reductions are achieved via technological advancement. This mechanism would maintain competitive prices in the short run; it can be assumed that competitors would enter in the long run. In addition, it is possible that if competitors enter the market, the Government could slowly withdraw its subsidy, as the monopolist would now have to behave competitively if he is to survive. However, the distributional effects must be considered: the subsidy means forgone expenditure in other areas of the economy, it may have to be raised via taxation and it represents a transparent form of income redistribution. Criticisms of this model by Cox et al (2008) argue that the regulator would need to know the entire demand function to implement the mechanism and that the income redistribution serves as a political barrier to acceptance. Harrison and McKee (1985) found that that when applied, the Loeb and Magat mechanism worked effectively 4/5 times. Conclusion The painstaking task of estimating the deadweight loss associated with monopoly has been given great attention over the last century, but has failed to reach a consensual agreement on the exact welfare losses which monopolies impose on society. We can take from empirical estimates of deadweight loss that monopoly behaviour may not be as welfare minimising as previously implied and that the truly inequitable effect of this market structure must lie in its income redistribution. Efficiency gains on the other hand, often combat the supposed welfare losses through greater output and economical use of resources. And as Littlechild (1981) advocates, monopolies are often beneficial to society. The onus of the policymaker seeking to regulate the monopolist should be to consider income redistribution as a predominant aspect of welfare losses. The Citigroup Plutonomy sums up the issue of income redistribution best: We hear so often about “the consumer”. But when we examine the data, there is no such thing as “the consumer” in the U.S. or UK, or other plutonomy countries. There are rich consumers, and there are the rest. (2005: 30) Reliable empirical evidence on estimates of deadweight loss would greatly aid economists and regulators alike. Unfortunately, as the tenor of this paper has indicated, neither of these millennia has yet arrived.
RC Internal Memo Leadership Management and Client Investigation Memorandum.

Evaluate leadership and management attributes that support critical decisions for nursing practice.
You have recently started a position as a department director with five managers reporting to you. Earlier today, one of your managers reports that a client expired on her unit. She suspects that a factor that may have contributed to the client’s demise may be related to the actions of a nurse on her unit. This nurse has several notes in her personnel file that reflect potential client abuse. You and the nurse manager both have concerns that this sentinel event must be investigated.
Later in the day, the Chief Nursing Officer asks you to speak to new nurse managers to share attributes of leadership with the plan of enhancing their leadership skills. You see an opportunity to combine the situation of the client with a bad outcome, due to the alleged influence of one of the nurses, while building information to share this real-life situation with new nurse leaders.
As a follow up to the investigation of the client’s unexpected death, generate an internal memo to your managers to reflect leadership and management attributes and include steps taken to investigate this unfortunate situation. As you create this memo, keep in mind that you should include:
At least five leadership and/or management attributes for nurse leaders, as well as how they can improve client outcomes.
Steps you would take to ensure the collection of data regarding this incident.
Describe how transformational leadership style may influence the process of investigating this professional nurse colleague that reports to one of your unit managers.
Provides stated ideas with professional language and attribution for credible sources with correct APA citation, spelling, and grammar.
RC Internal Memo Leadership Management and Client Investigation Memorandum

Syntax analyzer. You may use any top-down parser such as a RDP..

The assignment is to write a syntax analyzer.(base on project#1) You may use any top-down parser such as a RDP, a predictive recursive descent parser or a table driven predictive parser. Hence, your assignment consists of the following tasks: Rewrite the grammar Rat20SU to remove any left recursion (Also, use left factorization if necessary) 2. Use the lexer() generated in the assignment 1 to get the tokens 3. The parser should print to an output file the tokens, lexemes and the production rulesused; That is, first, write the token and lexeme found Then, print out all productions rules used for analyzing this token Note:- a simple way to do it is to have a “print statement” at the beginning of each function that will print the production rule. – It would be a good idea to have a “switch” with the “print statement” so that you can turn it on or off. 4. Error handling: if a syntax error occurs, your parser should generate a meaningful error message, such as token, lexeme, line number, and error type etc. Then, your program may exit or you may continue for further analysis. The bottom line is that your program must be able to parse the entire program if it is syntactically correct. 5. Turn in your assignment according to the specifications given in the project outline Example Assume we have the following statement ….more …. a = b + c; …. more …. One possible output would be as follows: …. more…. Token: IdentifierLexeme: a <Statement> -> <Assign> <Assign> -><Identifier>= <Expression> ; Token: OperatorLexeme: = Token: IdentifierLexeme: b <Expression> -> <Term> <Expression Prime> <Term> -> <Factor> <Term Prime> <Factor> -> <Identifier> Token:OperatorLexeme: + <Term Prime> -> e <Expression Prime> -> + <Term> <Expression Prime> Token:IdentifierLexeme: c <Term>-> <Factor> <Term Prime> <Factor> -> <Identifier> Token: SeparatorLexeme: ; <Term Prime> -> e <Expression Prime> -> e …. more…..
Syntax analyzer. You may use any top-down parser such as a RDP.

question about interview.

• Going to a lecture or presentation There are frequent talks on and off campus that relate to Global Business. I will send emails regarding some that happen in the College of Business. Write a 3- paragraph reflection with the same format as listed below. Attach the ticket or flyer to your write-up and submit to me. (max of 10 points) • Interview someone who has immigrated to the U.S. from another country and works in an organization in the U.S. You can interview a person in your family, a friend, a co-worker, etc. (max of 10 points) o Learn about the challenges that he/she faces: new language, customs, fitting in to the educational system, discrimination, etc. o Learn about his/her process of acculturation: what he/she has maintained from the country of origin and what has been adopted from this culture. o Ask the interviewee in what ways he/she could have been better supported for this transition by the organization they work for. o Finally, based on the ideas that your interviewee suggested for better support of immigrants, what are your recommendations for achievable strategies to support the acculturation of immigrants? o Provide a brief profile of this person (and a LinkedIn link if available) Format for Reports o Summarizing the information of the event you have attended o Explaining why it is important and how it relates to you career o Discussing fully how this relates to what you are learning in this course 12 point font, double spaced and max 2 pages
question about interview

Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd Proposal

Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd Proposal. Project Background Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd. is the dominating company which operates within the automobile industry of Australia and over the world. Toyota Motor Corporation produces vehicles which meet the customers’ expectations in relation to their quality and effect on the environments (Toyota Sustainability Report 2012). Thus, Toyota Motor Corporation focuses on the development of specific strategies regarding the corporate social responsibility (Toyota Sustainability Report 2010). The company focuses on principles of sustainability and aims to respond to the global needs of the environmental protection using the innovative technologies. The project of implementing the new water cycling technology at the company’s plant in Altona, Victoria, Australia, provides a lot of benefits for developing the firm’s image within the industry as the successful company which follows the ideas of sustainability and implements projects to reduce using water resources and pollution. Water cycling technologies are used within the industry and associated spheres by such companies as Mitsubishi (Japan) and Magic Hand Car Wash (Australia) (Magic Hand Car Wash 2012; Mitsubishi Electric: a practical water recycling solution 2013). Implementing the water cycling technology in Altona following the experience of Mitsubishi, Toyota Motor Corporation aims to become the leader company within the Australian automobile industry which uses the effective recycling technology basing on the implementation of the microfiltration system, several reverse osmosis systems, and the industrial storage tank (Commercial water tanks 2013; Reverse Osmosis Unit 2010). This fact can contribute to increasing the company’s competitive advantage and profits. The focus on the non-waste process is effective for the company’s progress and developing the notion of sustainability. 355,611 kL of water used at the Altona plant during 2011/2012 can be saved with the help of the new technology (Dissolved metals removal from wastewater 2011; Toyota Australia Sustainability Report 2012). The 100% reuse of the water resources is the main goal of Toyota Motor Corporation in Australia. The company’s profits will increase basing on the expense reduction and usage of cycling technologies. Project Definition Nature of Project The project planned to be implemented at the Altona plant is based on the usage of the water cycling technology which provides the 100% reuse of the water resources necessary for the production process with references to using the specific microfiltration system, several reverse osmosis systems, and the industrial storage tank. The water cycling technology guarantees the usage of all recycling water to reduce costs and resources. The stages of the project implementation include the development of the plan, training of employees, construction of the system, and the shift to the new system. Project Aim The main aim of the project is to contribute to the corporate social responsibility and environmental sustainability implementing the recycling process and gain profits with references to reducing expense and resources. Relating to the corporate social responsibility, the implementation of the new technology provides many people with the workplaces. Relating to the concept of sustainability, the water cycling technology can decrease the usage of water and environmental pollution. Project Scope The effectiveness of the project’s implementation depends on the efficiently set time frames for the project. The implementation of all stages of the project involves twelve weeks with references to the engagement and training of the internal staff and constructing the necessary elements of the project. Prerequisites and Assumptions The implementation process is based on the planned interruption of the current technological process at the Altona plant. The effective implementation of the water cycling technology depends on following the worked out schedule strictly regarding the planning, assessment, implementation, training, and monitoring activities. As a result, the introduction of the new water cycling system should lead to the complete usage of recycling water, to reducing costs, and creating the greener image of the company. There are some potential assumptions of the project’s implementation (Toyota Sustainability Report 2012). It is important to focus on preventing such problems as the absence of the water flow within the manufacturing section which can cause the cease of the process. Project Objectives Operational Objective To decrease the amount of water used by the company for the production process by 50% for the period of 2013/2014, it is necessary to implement the water cycling system interrupting the current process of production within twelve weeks, and to provide the training for employees within ten weeks. The effective implementation of the project is based on such activities as the development of a specific schedule, the work with the staff, the assessment of introduction aspects, the introduction of the technology’s elements, the monitoring of the process, and the final shift to using the new technology. The outputs of the process are the adequate introduction of the technology’s elements, the usage of the correct techniques, the necessary testing of technologies, and the qualified training for the staff. As a result, the implementation of the new water cycling system is successful and leads to saving costs and providing the company’s green image. Financial Objective The financial objective of the project is to reduce the company’s costs in 20% till the end of the 2013/2014 financial year with references to reducing the water usage in 50% providing the 100% water reuse with the help of the new cycling water system. The achievement of this financial objective depends on finding additional suppliers, researching specific licenses and laws in order to complete the reports and achieve the increase in profits basing on reducing the expense. The achievement of the increase in profits till the end of the 2013/2014 financial year can be discussed as the main expected financial outcome of the water cycling project implementation at the Altona plant. Marketing Objective The marketing objective of the Toyota Motor Corporation associated with the implementation of the new water cycling technology is based on the intention to increase the competitive advantage of the company within the industry referring to the sustainability and costs’ savings within the 2013/2014 financial year. The focus on using the innovative water cycling technology provides the company with opportunities to support the leading positions within the market. The main activities which can lead to the achievement of the goal are the changes in the company’s focuses and practices associated with using the new technology. Corporate Social Responsibility Objective The company’s CSR objective is to decrease the negative impact on the environment with references to reducing the amount of water used for the production processes in 50% within the twelve months of the 2013/2014 financial year. The activities connected with the process of the technology introduction will result in saving resources and reducing the pollution. Thus, the company will respond directly to the concept of sustainability in relation to the community and to the issue of environmental protection. References Commercial water tanks 2013. Web. Dissolved metals removal from wastewater 2011. Web. Magic Hand Car Wash 2012. Web. Mitsubishi Electric: a practical water recycling solution 2013. Web. Reverse Osmosis Unit 2010. Web. Toyota Australia Sustainability Report 2012. Web. Toyota Sustainability Report 2010. Web. Toyota Sustainability Report 2012. Web. Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd Proposal

University of California Los Angeles Public Health Reflection Paper

assignment writer University of California Los Angeles Public Health Reflection Paper.

This is a true reflective exercise. In short it is a 2-3 page reflection on what public health is to you, why we need to maintain that focus for society, and your involvement in the field whether or not you are majoring in public health. You want to reflect on how public health issues have changed and how they remain the same. Finally address what components in the class helped you learn and what you would like to see changed.some components from class:-epidemiology -Disease and how it is distributed -genetic disease
University of California Los Angeles Public Health Reflection Paper

The Rhetorical Situation Essay

The Rhetorical Situation Essay.

This week, we have focused on Lloyd Bitzer’s theory of the “rhetorical situation” — which includes concepts such as exigence, audience, and constraints — and how these concepts help us understand the “situation” within which we communicate. Bitzer helps us understand that people are always communicating to particular audiences, for particular purposes, and with particular limitations. In this Case Study, you will use Bitzer’s concepts to evaluate a piece of public communication — a response to hate mail. The hate mail was sent to the director of an art museum in Dresden, German named Hilke Wagner. You should begin by reading about her experience and how she responded to the hate mail in the article linked below. Then, write up an aprox. 1,000-word essay where you address all of the following questions:How would you describe the “rhetorical situation” that Ms. Wagner faced (using Bitzer’s terminology)?By Bitzer’s standards, do you think her response was fitting? Why or why not? Finally, Vatz’s argument made in response to Bitzer’s theory of the “rhetorical situation” is that public communicators (or “rhetors”) can do more than address a “rhetorical situation,” they can redefine it. How did the museum director redefine the rhetorical situation with which she was met?
The Rhetorical Situation Essay

What Is Collier’s Conflict Trap and How Can It Be Overcome?

Collier’s Conflict Trap is in essence the idea that civil war begets more civil war. Collier is no armchair academic. His work on the link between resource predation and civil war through the World Bank played an important role in spurring the UN resolution to regulate ‘blood diamonds.’ (Klare, 2001) This essay will explore Collier’s conception of the Trap, particularly examining how he frames it through the lens of Greed and Grievance. It will then proceed to place the Trap within Collier’s oeuvre, and critically analyse its explanatory power with regard to civil war, comparing how Collier’s conception fares against seminal civil war theorists. We find that while there are gaps in his explanation of civil war, the Trap still holds up, and can be expanded upon through synthesis with competing theories. The second part of the essay deals with possible methods to overcome the Trap. Both international intervention and good local governance are found to be possible solutions, but local governance emerges as the more effective approach. The Conflict Trap In formal terms, the conflict trap is when the “long-term risk of conflict in a country or region increases considerably after the first conflict onset.” (Hegre 2012) For the Conflict Trap to hold weight, its fundamental premise must be true: that conflict begets conflict. There is substantial evidence that this is the case. It is estimated that the probability of re-incidence of civil war within 12 years is approximately 40%. (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2008). Collier’s findings are corroborated by other studies. (Hegre et al., 2001; Walter, 2004; Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007). But the Trap articulates more than correlation; it demands causality. This causality is substantiated through Collier’s explanation for the causes of civil war. Though he proposes a range of causes of civil war, the pertinent causes to the Trap are: Reversal of Growth Creation of ‘Rebellion-Specific’ Capital Erosion of institutions War causes economic regression (Collier 1999), and low income (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) and low growth (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) cause civil war. Collier’s trap is well substantiated in this regard. ‘Rebellion-Specific’ capital refers to resources useful to rebellion. This includes weapons and ammunition, as well as trained military age veterans and natural resources. These are created during conflict and remain in a country even after its end. (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 569) Civil war damages the organizational capital of the state, as well as erodes faith in democratic institutions. Fig 1. The Mechanics of the Conflict Trap Let us place Collier’s Trap within his larger body of work. His extensive work on civil war and development spans roughly 10 years and has evolved considerably.[1] The Conflict Trap exists within Collier’s framework of general causes of civil war. He posits that the outbreak of war is caused by a combination of feasibility and motivation. Examining the latter, he frames motivations for non-state actors within a dichotomy of “Greed and Grievance.” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) While neither is formally defined, they can be summarized as, respectively, an opportunistic profit-oriented motive, and a response to perceived injustice. Some examples Collier provides as Grievance are “ethnic hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequality.” (Collier 2001) Collier is sceptical of the explanatory power of (his self-ideated) Grievance. In his analysis of the 2000 Fijian coup, he quips that “Fiji for the Fijians” was a less convincing rallying cry than “give the mahogany contract to the Americans”. (Collier 2007) More pointedly, he concludes that grievances of actors are “substantially disconnected” from the larger grievances of inequality, political rights, and ethnic rights. (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) Is his dismissal of grievance valid? Analysing the Trap The dichotomy between Greed and Grievance is ultimately a meaningless one. Consider the correlation between GDP per capita and the incidence of war, which Collier finds (2004). A rebel might take up arms because she has a legitimate grievance with poor economic conditions, or because she simply can make more money fighting than farming. Collier’s quantitative approach cannot make a distinction between the two, and hence cannot meaningfully refute claims to grievance. In addition, the line between what constitutes greed and grievance is not meaningfully drawn. Suppose a strong democratic government is absent from a country. Would this indicate a grievance, because rebels want a better government, or greed, because this provides an opportunity for an easy takeover? Fig 2. Greed vs Grievance A more productive approach might be to examine how grievances are socially constructed. Grievances do not exist in a vacuum. They must first be identified and articulated. In other words, they must be socialized. The existence of an “identity-based collective action frame” has been found to be an important factor in the genesis of conflict. (Aspinall, 2007) Aspinall’s work on Aceh, Indonesia demonstrates that grievances are socially constructed. However, whether Collier’s explanation for how material conditions affect the probability of incidence of civil war is effective, however, does not detract from the claim that they do, and hence do not weaken the veracity of the conflict trap. The conflict trap merely outlines the causal link between civil wars, the material conditions they create, and further war. The Conflict Trap can be synthesized with other theories and extended through an expansion of the definition of ‘rebellion-specific capital’. Viewing ‘identity capital’ (Aspinall 2007) as a form of rebellion-specific capital allows the conflict trap to work within a wider range of frameworks. Additionally, examining how the social processes of war lead to ripe conditions for war could be fruitful. Wood (2004) explored how the social processes of war can lead to further violence. This can be understood to also be a conflict-trap-like process, expanding our understanding of the trap. Overcoming the Conflict Trap Is the Conflict trap inevitable? There are two main approaches to overcome it: external intervention and fostering domestic good government. External intervention is an effective approach to breaking the Trap’s vicious cycle. By removing the factors that contribute to war (which were in turn created by war), intervention can prevent further war from breaking out. A much-praised example of international intervention is the inception of the Kimberley Process, a UN-initiated certification scheme to verify diamonds as conflict-free. Collier called it “the most important example” of international action.[2] (2003) The Process breaks the conflict trap by removing rebels’ access to capital (which they gained through war). The removal of a key resource “substantially altered” the conflict dynamic. (Klare 2000) Soon after the ratification of the Process in 2000, two rebel groups in Sierra Leone and Angola which relied on diamonds were defeated. External Intervention External intervention, however, has its flaws. Intervention is inherently tied to the interests of the intervening state(s), and thus not a reliable or dependable long-term solution to the conflict trap. Even when the preconditions for civil war were glaringly evident, the UN was devoid of power to intervene in Rwanda, in 1993. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) The UN was bound to withdraw its armed peacekeepers at the outbreak of war. The resultant conflict and genocide are considered a major failure of the UN. (Atwood, 2014) External intervention is inherently limited because international organizations must strike a balance between intervention and upholding sovereignty. Another alternative is good local governance. Specific policies have been found to increase or decrease the risk of conflict re-occurrence. Collier finds that an increase in military spending increases the risk of conflict re-occurrence while a focus on inclusive social policies reduces the risk. (2003) In addition, a focus on good economic policy can restore growth and hence break the conflict trap. This is especially pertinent as growth is “more sensitive to policy during the first decade post-conflict.” (Collier 2003) But how does a government just ‘become good’? Even if they were to follow Collier’s guidelines of implementing inclusive social policy, a country does not become inclusive by wishing it so. Organizations like the UNDP present a good solution. UNDP assists local governments develop productive policies and can thus break the conflict trap. By allowing the local governments to ultimately execute these policies, advisors circumvent the issue of sovereignty. We have examined Collier’s conflict trap, contextualized its place within his academic canon, and analysed its explanatory power alongside competing theories. The conflict trap accurately describes reality. While gaps were found in its conception, synthesis with competing theories allows it to describe reality with greater nuance. To overcome the trap, both international intervention and good local governance are found to be effective, though the former has significant limitations. Good local governance coupled with international expertise emerges as the best way forward. Works Cited Journals Aspinall, Edward. 2007. “The Construction of Grievance.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (6): 950–972. Collier, Paul. 1999. “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 51 (1):168–183. Collier, Paul. 2000. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” unpublished paper, World Bank. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4): 563–95. Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke and Söderbom, Måns. 2008. “On the Duration of Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research 41 (3): 253-273 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, Rohner, Dominic. 2009. “Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers 61 (1): 1–27, Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. 2010. “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2009.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (4):501–509 Hegre, Håvard and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4): 508–535 Hegre, Håvard. 2012. “Civil Conflict and Development.” Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO. Hegre, Håvard et al. 2011. “The Conflict Trap.” Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO. Lacina, Bethany and Gleditsch, Peter. 2005. “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths.” European Journal of Population 21 (2):145–166. Wood, Elisabeth. 2008. “The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks.” Annual Review of Political Science, 11: 539-561 Books Collier, Paul. 2007. The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Le Billon, Philippe. 2005. Fuelling war: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict. London, Routledge. Klare, Michael. 2001. Natural Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York, Metropolitan Books. Others Charlotte, Attwood. 2014. ‘Rwanda genocide: UN ashamed, says Ban Ki-moon,’ BBC News, Kigali, 14 April. His first notable publication “On the Economic Causes of Civil War,” (1998) investigated the economic causes of civil war. The later “On the Economic Causes of Civil War” (2004) refined this by broadly categorizing causes into greed and grievance. His most up-to-date conclusion (as of 2008) is that feasibility is the most credible factor, alongside greed and grievance. It should be noted that Collier played a significant role in the ratification of the process through his role at the World Bank. (Klare 2000)