Keiser Career College Miami Lakes How Computers Change the Way We Think Essay.
DIRECTIONSNow that you have created a thorough outline, you should continue to expand the outline into an essay format using proper APA style. Additionally, you will need to show competency in constructing a research-based argumentative piece of writing. To meet that goal, you will need to meet the following requirements:Demonstrate critical thinking and critical analysis skills, including your use of a research based argumentationWrite between 1,000 – 1,200 wordsPapers that do not meet at least 1,000 words are subject to a pro-rated penalty. (i.e. submitting 800 words would result in a 20% loss of grade as 20% of the paper’s word requirements were not met)Effectively organize your essay. Write a clear introduction, thesis statement, multiple body paragraphs supporting the thesis statement, and a clear conclusionUse at least four sources.Using a source means quoting, paraphrasing, or summarizing it, including a citation each time it is being usedReference each source you use in your reference listYou should use the following sources:Your textbook selection from Weeks 1, 2, and 3Two peer-reviewed academic journal sources from Keiser’s e-LibraryAt least one additional credible source, which may include a reading from your text, the e-Library, or another reputable location from the KU libraryTry to use only four sources to avoid any instances of “unintentional” plagiarism.Do not use sources in the first body paragraph/introduction or the conclusion of your essay.Contact your instructor if you are unsure as to whether a source will count towards the requirements.If less than four sources are used, 10% may be taken off for each missing source (i.e. using only two sources would result in a 20% loss of grade)No block quotes should be included. Use integrated quotes only.Use 3rd person objective point of view only. Avoid 1st and 2nd person point of view.Use academic language and proper grammar and mechanics. Consider using the Online Writing Lab or your local campus Writing Studio prior to submitting this paper.REQUIREMENTSFormat your paper using 7th edition APA requirements. (No abstract is needed for APA 7 student papers.)No more than 20% of the paper should be from quoted source support.No visuals should be used (i.e. images, charts, graphs, etc.). Use written material only.No subheadings are required for the final essay.This paper is due by Sunday of Week 4. Only one submission is allowed. Contact your instructor if you have a problem.Papers submitted after 11:59 PM on Sunday of Week 4 will not be graded without prior approval by the instructor.
Introduction For the longest time now, immigrants have continued to shape the history of America. Due to many opportunities present in the US, many foreigners move to America from across the globe. As a matter of fact, the fact of cultural diversity has been cited as one of the strongest aspects of America in regard to development. In the past, there were no restrictions on immigration to the US but the country now is characterized by many immigration restrictions. However, even with the current strict restrictions, there are estimated undocumented immigrants adding up to 12 million today. The imposition of these restrictions does not necessarily mean that immigration only impact the host country negatively but rather it is meant to maintain the country’s stability in all aspects. This paper will evaluate how the US Government should encourage the immigration because of its benefits to the nation. US immigration policy Due to the increasing volumes of immigrants, restrictions were made to regulate this number which was rising gradually. Although there were initial several restrictions to US immigration, the Immigration and Nationality Act was and still is the most effective policy although it abolishes quotas that were previously based on national origin. This was replaced by several preferences which have been used to determine who gains entry to the United States. Family members are among those who gain entry without restrictions. Other preferences include professional workers such as scientists and artists among others although their entry is only acceptable in a short supply. This restriction was meant to create equality among people from all nationalities and particularly to remove the previous restriction that had been imposed on Asia (Cohn 1). Reasons for increased immigration to the US There is no particular reason causing the ever rising immigration to the United States. Some of the contributing factors as reported by various economic historians include political and economic stability in the USA, great differences in real wages between United States and other countries, high degree of urbanization and industrialization in the United States, previous immigrations from other countries and population growth rates in the home countries of the immigrants. The factor of real wage difference between the U.S. and other countries carries a lot of weight in immigration rates to the United States of America (Cohn 1). Get your 100% original paper on any topic done in as little as 3 hours Learn More With economy fluctuating in many nations nowadays, many employees are receiving very low income which can barely sustain their basic needs alone. Additionally, life has become very expensive with prices on basic commodities spiking up year in year out. While many countries across the globe are facing economic crisis, the United States of America have always maintained its economy stable. This has been depicted in various aspects of life including rates of wages for employees at various levels. For instance, in a country such as Kenya, university graduate employees earn a monthly salary of around Kshs. 30,000 which is equivalent to an estimate of $ 400. On the other hand, in the United States of America, an ordinary messenger with no further education beyond high school may be earning up to $ 500 a month with possibilities of other employee benefits. It is precisely for this factor that many people from economically instable countries immigrate to America purposely to seek for sustainable sources of income ad better livelihood (U.S. Immigration Support 1). Additionally, the high degree of industrialization and urbanization in the United States of America has been another contributing factor to the increasing immigration from many countries. Due to its economic stability, The U.S. has been in a better position to develop in industrialization. This provides more employment opportunities in the U.S. which are very rare in other countries due to lack of technological knowhow and other factors which facilitate industrialization. These countries lack economic and industrial development as they are only stuck to traditional modes of gaining income which are insufficient to maintain the ever rising population. Additionally, many countries have broken their traditional ties creating a free workforce and more mobile laborers. Besides, young graduates now prefer working in a place where they have opportunities to be creative and develop experimental projects. Many countries do not have the equipment to facilitate these developments and this causes many young people to move to U.S. not only as graduates to work, but also to further their studies where the level of education is way above the rest. We will write a custom Essay on U.S. Immigration Control specifically for you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More The factor of urbanization has also contributed to the increasing immigration to the U.S. with many people moving to the United States of America due to the attraction of urbanization which is directly associated with industrialization and economic stability. Another very important reason causing the increase in immigration to the U.S. is the need to earn extra cash. Many people are moving to the U.S. not for the desire for development and education opportunities, but simply to earn money. These people do not care about the kind of job they land into it as long as it is paying them well enough to take care of their families back home. As a matter of fact, most of them do what many would call low class jobs such cleaning, cooking, helping in personal houses as house helps but this does not matter to them because what they earn in these jobs is way much better than what they would earn back home even with more decent jobs. Due to border restriction, these people are stuck in the foreign countries for several years not because they want to but because they have to. However, this does not hold them back, as they send the greatest part of their earnings back home most of who use unofficial means of sending money to evade taxation and recording procedures (Walt 1). This has been demonstrated by the amount of their earnings they send home while they keep very little for themselves characterized by low standards of living they are exposed to. However, despite the suffering of being separated from families and unfavorable living conditions as well as the risks of importation, the efforts do pay handsomely as research shows that almost all of these immigrants have changed the lives of their families a great deal from house ownership to educating their children and improving their lives at all levels (Walt 1). Impacts of immigration to the United States of America Positive impacts Despite many people thinking that immigration causes a reduction in the general wage rate of workers in the United States, the fact is that immigration does actually result to an increase in wage rates. However, this is only possible if the immigrants bring in new economic resources or at least work towards providing additional resources. A good example of a positive result of immigration is the expansion of the westward part of the United States resulting from the large scale immigration from Europe. This move in turn resulted to an increase in natural resources and land and kept the wages high. Not sure if you can write a paper on U.S. Immigration Control by yourself? We can help you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More This was possible through establishment of new job opportunities thus maintaining the ratio between job opportunities and job seekers. Even in the event that immigration does not result to increase in wage rate, the rate is kept constant with no change at all. Besides having impacts on wage rate, immigration also benefits the labor force by availing new employees with different skills and expertise thus creating a diversified workforce within the U.S. This diversification is very significant in development and invention of new technologies as ideas are much diversified and based on a wider global scale (Friedberg and Hunt 32). This means that such developments and advancements can be made based on different target markets and this would in return result to more income for the country hence more economic stabilization. Additionally, increased labor force relieves the pressure of multitasking and facilitates division of labor and specialization. This helps improve production in all aspects of the economy. Economic benefits have also been reported in the U.S. in regard to immigration. Some of these immigrants do not just move to the United States of America for pleasure or better lifestyle, but to seek scientific opportunities which are hardly available in their home countries. Once they get such opportunities, they do not hesitate to engage in innovative activities which are beneficial to all. Since America has been a leading nation in technological advancements, scientific individuals are encouraged to move there even if temporarily since there is an already existing conducive environment for such activities. This way, the country gets to be the primary beneficiary of scientific and other related developments. Most of the immigrants moving to the United States of America are already educated individuals who are ready to work immediately. This way, living conditions of citizens are generally improved. Government income may as well increase from taxes paid indirectly through purchases made on commodities by the illegal immigrants as well as other taxation income. Lastly, the fact that the number of individuals migrating to the U.S. to seek employment is regulated during periods of low job opportunities proves that the U.S. has nothing to lose after all. Negative impacts Despite all the benefits that the U.S. has to gain from immigrants, there are a few challenges facing the U.S. due to the increasing rates of immigrations. Pressure on population is the most common challenge faced, not only in the U.S. but in any other country in which immigrants move to. Physical overcrowding in residential areas as well as in urban centers and industrial areas poses a great environmental risk due to the consequent pollution associated with overcrowding. Besides environmental risks, high immigration rates result to overcrowding in government social services and amenities such as public transport means and hospitals among others (Hanes 55). This results to inadequate provision of social services to the Native American citizens which may have serious national ramifications. In this case, the U.S. government is forced to invest more of its income on such services instead of using it on other economic development aspects. This pulls the country back economically as it remains stagnant with no economic advancements. Although we discussed earlier that immigrations may result to increased wages in the native country, this is not always the case. This is because if the inflow of more labor force continues to increase without a similar inflow of new resources and capital, an imbalance between the two factors is created and resulting to decreased wages as the labor force becomes more than the resources in the market. When this happens, many of the native job seekers as well as the immigrants are left jobless and this creates a setback in which the living standards of such individuals are lowered. Conclusion Immigration to the U.S. has been very high going back to historical times such as World War I (Chiswick 904). People from all over the world have been moving to the U.S. at an alarming rate up until the nationality and immigration Act was implemented to regulate persons gaining entry to the country. This has been done by imposing quotas to people who are non-native American citizens. However, the restrictions differ depending on the different groups of immigrants which include professionals, students and relatives to U.S. native citizens among others. Despite these restrictions, immigrants have been beneficial to the U.S. in various fields including economy, workforce and diversity among others. However, high rates of immigration do put pressure on the U.S. in terms of population, use of government services and sometimes by causing a reduction in the average wage rate of American employees. As a result, proper evaluation between the positive and the negative sides of immigration should be made prior to imposition of immigration restrictions. Works Cited Chiswick, Barry. “The effects of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born men”. Journal of political economy 86. (1978): 897 – 921. Print. Cohn, Raymond. “Immigration to the United States”. EH.net: Economic history services. (2010). Web. Friedberg, Rachael. and Jennifer, Hunt. “The impact of immigration on host country’s wages, employment and growth”. The journal of economic perspectives 9. (1995): 23 – 44. Print. Hanes, Christopher. “Immigrants relative rate of wage growth in the late nineteenth century”. Explorations in economic history 33. (1996): 35 – 64. Print. U.S. IS. “Immigration to the United States”. U.S. Immigration support: online guide to U.S visas, green cards and citizenship. (2011). Web. Walt, Vivienne. “Follow the money”. Time magazine world. (26 November 2005). Web.
Abstract Many existing explanations of electoral volatility in Latin America have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level. In this paper, I apply a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test various explanations of electoral volatility on data of 128 parties in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011. My most important finding pertains to the conditional effect of a party’s incumbency status on electoral volatility. First, the results show that the effect of party age on reducing electoral volatility is stronger for incumbent parties. Second, an incumbent party has a lower level of electoral volatility than opposition parties during periods of stronger economic performance. Last, while an irregular alteration of political institutions is hypothesized to increase the level of volatility for all the parties in a country, the effect is more significant for the incumbent party. Explaining Electoral Volatility in Latin America: Evidence at the Party Level Introduction Concerns with party system institutionalization and its consequences in developing countries have grown in the past decade. Extant literature underscores that political parties play an important role in linking diverse social forces with democratic institutions, channeling societal demands, managing sociopolitical conflicts, holding government officials accountable to the electorate, and legitimizing the regime (Dix 1992; Sartori 1968; Schattschneider 1942). In this sense, political parties with stable and consistent support across elections not only ensure their long-term survival, but also help institutionalize the party system. A stable and institutionalized party system fosters more effective programmatic representation (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 157) and facilitates the institutionalization of political uncertainty (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). In contrast, a democratic country with a poorly institutionalized party system where electoral volatility is very high tends to produce populist leaders and discourage the incumbent party from making long-term policy commitments (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  In comparison to Western Europe and the United States, the level of electoral volatility is exceptionally high in Latin America (Payne et al. 2002). In the 1990s, the overall electoral volatility in this region was about twice that in the developed world (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Weak partisan identities of voters, rapid voting choice changes, and unpredictable election campaigns are prevalent political characteristics in this region (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006), but what explains the variation in electoral volatility in Latin America? Previous work on electoral volatility has provided explanations about political institutions, national economic performance, social cleavages, ethnic heterogeneity, and historical factors (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; Madrid 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005). These explanations have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level, even though that is the level at which the effects of certain relevant explanatory factors are expected to work. Why do some parties have higher levels of electoral volatility than others? Do factors cause electoral volatility at the country level have the same impact on party level volatility? Does the incumbent party enjoy certain advantages that opposition parties do not have to secure electoral stability? This paper aims to address these questions by examining electoral evidence at the party level in Latin America. I generated a value of electoral volatility for each party between elections by performing Morgenstern and Potthoff’s (2005) components-of-variance model on an original dataset of lower house electoral results at the district level for 128 parties in 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011. I first demonstrate that the patterns of electoral volatility at the party-level differ from that at the country level. I then apply a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test country-level, party-level, and cross-level hypotheses regarding why some parties are more electorally volatile than others. The most important result of this study is that the incumbent parties and opposition parties have different behavioral patterns under certain conditions. Specifically, I find that a better national economic performance helps the incumbent party, rather than every party in the country, to reduce the level of electoral volatility. Moreover, I demonstrate that an irregular institutional change greatly increases the incumbent party’s electoral volatility, rather than that of every party in the country. At the party level, I find that the effect of a party’s incumbency status is contingent on certain party-specific characteristics. The results show that incumbent parties that were founded in earlier periods are generally less volatile than younger incumbent parties. These findings are robust after controlling for a variety of other explanatory factors that will affect electoral volatility, using a different sample of parties, or adopting a different model specification. In sum, relative to previous work, this study is distinctive in that it uncovers patterns of electoral volatility and provides a better understanding of the dynamics of party politics in new democracies. Why Study Party-level Electoral Volatility? I focus on party volatility in this paper, and I argue that examining electoral volatility at the party level facilitates a better understanding of the patterns of party development. In general, electoral volatility refers to the phenomenon in which voters switch voting choice in consecutive elections. Many previous have used the Pedersen Index  (Pedersen 1983) to operationalize the level of party system electoral volatility (Birch 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring 1999; Roberts and Wibbels 1999). However, as Mair (1997, 66) argues, aggregate volatility measurement such as the Pedersen Index explains little about the persistence or decay of political cleavages. Mainwaring et al. (2010) argue that the Pedersen Index fails to distinguish between the volatility caused by vote switches from one party to the other and the volatility caused by the entry and exit of parties from the political system. Morgenstern and Potthoff’s (2005, 30) critique is that the Pedersen Index fails to account for the relative electoral movement of individual parties within the system; in other words, the Pedersen Index tells nothing about which party is more volatile than the others. This problematic feature may produce mistaken if not biased inferences. For instance, although the Pedersen Index indicates that Argentina’s mean party system institutionalization is lower than that of Brazil and Mexico from the 1980s to the 2000s (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 159), it does not indicate that Argentina’s electoral volatility is largely a result of the crisis of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) instead of the incumbent Partido Justicialista (PJ) (Levitsky 1998, 461). In short, aggregate electoral volatility is likely to mask patterns of party-level electoral volatility. The level of electoral volatility matters for a party because it is an important indicator of a party’s long-term survival. Party volatility is also an indicator of party institutionalization (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). According to Janda (1980, 26-7), an institutionalized party should have stable partisan support because it can secure stable representation by building strong and regular societal ties with the electorate. A more institutionalized party should have a lower level of electoral volatility and a higher probability to survive over time, and it also implies that this party has a stable, routinized organizational structure and/or supporters with strong partisanship (Levitsky 1998). As Randall and Svåsand (2002) contend, a high level of party system institutionalization does not necessarily indicate that all the parties within the system have an equally high level of party institutionalization. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that a high level of country volatility implies that all the parties in this country are equally volatile between elections. Therefore, a more important research question needs to be addressed: Is a party’s electoral volatility determined by country-level factors, features of the party, or both? In the next section, I will discuss and propose testable hypotheses for the empirical analyses. Explaining Party Volatility Party volatility considers the degree to which a party’s average vote is stable across two consecutive elections. Previous studies about country-level electoral volatility have considered national economic performance, political institutions, and social structural factors as three competing theoretical explanations of electoral volatility. However, some of the tested hypotheses, particularly those regarding economic voting and institutional theories, are actually derived from behavioral patterns of individual parties. Thus, these hypotheses should be tested at a more appropriate level, that is, the party level. Unlike previous studies of electoral volatility that focus on country-level explanations, this paper focuses on explaining party-level volatility, and such a research design facilitates the testing of party-level, country-level, and cross-level hypotheses. In particular, I argue that the behavior of the incumbent party is different from opposition parties. Moreover, I contend that the effect of a party’s incumbency status is contingent on certain factors. Next, I will discuss various competing theoretical arguments about party electoral volatility at different analytical levels. Party Age and Incumbency Status Previous studies have discussed how time affects electoral volatility at the country level. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) argue that an older system is likely to have deeper and stronger historical roots in society than younger ones. Therefore, the level of electoral volatility will decrease with the age of a party system. Adopting a similar approach, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) propose a democratization timing explanation for why some party systems are more stable than others. The authors demonstrate that the level of democratic governance voters have experienced will affect the level of electoral volatility. In other words, what matters for accounting for stabilization of party competition is the timing when democracy began in the country. Voters in democracies that were created in earlier periods had stronger attachments to parties, so that can help forge stable patterns of party competition (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 163). In contrast, political elites in new democracies have less incentive to make efforts in party building, since they tend to depend on mass media and modern campaigns to win the elections. While Mainwaring and Zoco’s thesis sheds light on the relationship between democratic learning and party system stabilization, it ignores the variation of party age within a country. Clearly, old and young parties can exist in both old and new democracies in Latin America.  However, Mainwaring and Zoco’s argument might imply that party volatility will be higher in a newly-founded democracy, regardless of how old a party is in this country. To avoid this problematic inference, a more appropriate research strategy is to test Mainwaring and Zoco’s argument at the party level. Specifically, if Mainwaring and Zoco’s argument holds at the party level, we may expect that political parties that were founded in earlier periods will have lower levels of electoral volatility, because their supporters have much stronger partisan attachments than the supporters of younger parties. In contrast, younger parties will have higher levels of electoral volatility because the elites of these parties will have less incentive to delve into party building. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is generated: H1: A party that was founded in earlier periods will have a lower level of electoral volatility than a party that was founded later. The second testable hypothesis of this study is about a party’s incumbency status. Some scholars argue that institutions such as states and parties might have their own strategic goals and “behave as political actors in their own right” (Cox and McCubbins 1993). While parties can be different in terms of various characteristics, whether or not a party is the president’s party is a crucial for explaining differences in party behavior. Incumbency advantage generally implies that incumbents are more likely to win an election than the counterpart nonincumbents (Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974). Cox and Katz (1997) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) decomposed the concept of incumbent advantage into three elements: (1) direct officeholder effect, such as opportunities for providing constituency services (Fiorina 1977; King 1991) and using legislative resources such as personal staff for performing casework (Cover and Brumberg 1982); (2) the ability of incumbents to scare off high-quality challengers (Krasno and Green 1988); and (3) the generally higher quality of the incumbents due to their experiences and campaign skills (Fenno 1978). The literature on incumbent advantage provides useful insights for this study. Since presidency is often considered as an extraordinarily important political institution in Latin America (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), it is expected that the president’s party has advantages that opposition parties do not have. In particular, the incumbent party is more likely to receive access to public funds and more capable in allocating targeted resources to secure its survival (Calvo and Murillo 2004). Although being an incumbent party does not necessarily indicate a higher probability of winning an election in the contemporary Latin American context, it is reasonable to expect that an incumbent party should have a more stable electoral performance than opposition parties. However, an incumbent party in a new democracy might not have a stable electoral performance under certain circumstances. The experience in Latin America suggests that, when a country is governed by a new party, the patterns of electoral competition will become more unstable. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup in 1992 and the adoption of a new constitution in 1993 helped to dramatically increase votes for the incumbent Cambio 90 in the 1995 election. However, Fujimori’s 40-point plunge in public approval ratings in mid-1997 (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 586), and the demise of Fujimori’s party in the 2000 and 2001 elections, not only suggest a high level of unpopularity of Fujimori’s neoliberal structural reforms, but also a high level of fluid electoral preference when a country is governed by a new party. Although the effect of a party’s incumbency status on party electoral volatility might not be clear, it is possible that this effect is conditional on other factors. In particular, if party age helps to reduce electoral volatility, it then makes sense that the effect should be stronger for the incumbent party. An incumbent party with an older age suggests that it not only has more access to use state resources to enhance its electoral competitiveness, but it also has stronger party organizations and members. Put differently, an older incumbent party might have a lower level of electoral volatility than a young incumbent party. Therefore, I generate the following hypothesis: H2: The effect of party age on reducing electoral volatility is stronger for an incumbent party. Incumbency, National Economy, and Institutional Change Besides the party-level hypotheses, I also test cross-level hypotheses to see whether the effect of a party’s incumbency status is contingent on certain country-level factors. The first cross-level explanation concerns the interaction between incumbency and economy. Economic voting theory argues that some citizens will respond to the waxing and waning of the economy by shifting their votes to reward or punish incumbent parties and officeholders (Lewis-Beck 1988). In other words, electoral volatility is driven by voters’ retrospective evaluations of economic performance of the incumbent government. More specifically, economic hardship can be expected to increase electoral volatility by undermining the loyalties and support for the incumbent party and by increasing the opposition parties’ votes. By contrast, in a better economic climate, one would expect that people prefer to maintain the status quo by continuing to support the incumbent party so that electoral volatility decreases. The proposition that economic conditions shape election outcomes in democratic countries is robust for studies using individual survey data (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). In contrast, analyses of electoral volatility at the country level find inconsistent evidence about economic voting. Remmer (1991; 1993) and Madrid (2005) demonstrate that economic performance has a significant impact on the level of electoral volatility in Latin America. The evidence in advanced democracies also shows that economic performance strongly shapes electoral volatility (Bischoff forthcoming). However, recent analyses of new democracies in post-communist Europe (Epperly 2011) and Africa (Ferree 2010) show that economic voting is not a crucial factor in explaining party system volatility. One possible explanation for these inconsistent findings pertains to the appropriateness of the level of analysis. Specifically, since economic voting theory suggests that national economic performance will affect the extent of vote switches between the incumbent party and opposition parties between elections, it is more appropriate and necessary to test this argument at the party level. If the economic voting argument holds, it is expected that the incumbent party will have a lower electoral volatility than opposition parties when the economic performance is better. Conversely, the incumbent party is expected to have a higher electoral volatility than the opposition parties when the economy is in crisis. Based on the logic of economic voting, I propose the following economic voting hypothesis on party volatility: H3: The incumbent party will have a lower level of electoral volatility than opposition parties when the national economy is better. The second cross-level explanation is about the interaction between incumbency and institutional change. As the literature of rational choice institutionalism indicates, institutions matter because political actors’ behavior is driven mainly by a strategic calculus facing the limitation and opportunities that particular institutional or organizational settings offer (Hall and Taylor 1996). The stable persistence of political institutions that regulate electoral competition helps political parties to socialize their voters over time, and upholds the legitimacy of a democratic regime. Therefore, a fundamental alteration or an irregular discontinuity in important political institutions is expected to have a “shock” effect on the competitive equilibrium of elections. Based on evidence from Latin American countries, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Madrid (2005) find that the electoral dynamics of a party system is greatly altered by the adoption of a new constitution, a significant enfranchisement, and/or irregular changes in the executive branch such as a presidential “self-coup” (autogolpe), or a forced resignation of the president. Although these dramatic and irregular alterations of existing institutions are found to increase electoral volatility at the country level, it makes sense that such shocks should also influence party-level electoral volatility. In particular, it is expected that such irregular institutional changes will increase the volatility of the incumbent party to a greater extent. Recent political developments in Latin America suggest that this hypothesis is reasonable. For instance, in Ecuador the adoption of a new constitution in 2008 helped the incumbent Alianza PAIS increase its level of voter support in the 2009 election. In contrast, irregular removal of presidents also leads to higher electoral volatility for incumbent parties, but in a negative direction. The 2009 Honduran coup d’état with the removal of President Manuel Zelaya made his Partido Liberal de Honduras (PLH) suffer a significant loss in the election at the end of the year. Likewise, the resignation of President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 2000 also led to an electoral fiasco for the governing Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria. Based on the discussion above, I propose the following hypothesis: H4: The incumbent party will have a higher level of electoral volatility than opposition parties after a shock of an irregular institutional discontinuity. Alternative Explanations of Party Volatility In the empirical analysis, I control for a number of factors that are likely to affect party volatility. At the party level, I control for the size of a party. Party size may influence the stability of electoral performance. The literature of legislators party switching suggests that larger parties in the legislature are more attractive to potential party switchers because they generally have more political influence (Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2008). Therefore, it is possible that a larger party should have a lower level of electoral volatility because it is more attractive to voters who are unwilling to “waste” their votes on parties with little chance to win the elections. However, it is also possible that smaller parties, especially those with strong regional base, may have low electoral volatility. It is because such parties are able to sustain their survival by securing a small but strong portion of the electorate over time. At the country level, I control for party system fragmentation and ethnic fractionalization. First, according to Pedersen (1983), electoral volatility increases with the number of parties in a system because a greater number of parties suggests that the ideological difference between the parties is small so that voters tend to switch their votes from one party to another between elections. In addition, party system fragmentation will destabilize democratic regimes because it “tends to inhibit the construction of inherent legislative majorities” (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 578). Although the hypothesis of party system fragmentation has only been tested at the country level in previous literature (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Birch 2003; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005), it is possible that a fragmented party system will increase electoral volatility at the party level. Another factor that may explain electoral volatility is social cleavages. Madrid (2005, 3) observes that the theoretical expectation that stronger ethnic cleavages help stabilize party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) presumes that parties will provide quality representation of distinct ethnic groups and establish strong linkages with them. In Latin America, this expectation does not hold since most party systems have been composed principally of catch-all parties that have drawn support from a variety of social groups. Because minority ethnic groups would not feel well-represented under this context, the level of electoral volatility tends to be higher since it is unlikely for them to form strong partisan identities (Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Madrid 2005). In short, it is expected that Latin American parties in a highly ethnically fragmented social context will have higher levels of electoral volatility. Last, following previous studies of country-level electoral volatility (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005; Madrid 2005), I control for a trend factor of party electoral volatility in the model. In a cross-sectional time-series design, Trend controls for the potential problem of spurious correlation when the values of the dependent variable and the independent variables vary independently but in a consistent direction over time. Measurement and Data The unit of analysis in this research is party-elections-country (e.g. Partido dos Trabalhadores 1994-1998 in Brazil). My conception of the dependent variable requires the collection of legislative electoral returns at the district level across time, differentiated by party or party coalition.  The data include 128 parties in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011 (N=527).  Most district-level electoral data are compiled from official electoral results on the website of each country’s electoral administrative body.  For the countries that were democratized later in the 1980s or in the 1990s, only the elections after the first democratic election were included.  Since Latin American countries have different timing of democratization and term length, the data structure of this analysis is unbalanced. A party is selected for the analyses if the party once obtained more than 5% of votes in any legislative election held between 1978 and 2011 in the country. This selection criterion ensures the inclusion of a diversity of parties. To generate the value of party volatility, I adopted Morgenstern and Potthoff’s (2005) components-of-variance model on district-level data between two consecutive legislative elections held within the same constituency border.  One major advantage of this components-of-variance model is that it simultaneously takes into account various features of a party’s electoral performance when generating the value of party volatility. Specifically, Morgenstern and Potthoff’s model enables the calculation of three components of a party’s vote share in a particular election: volatility, district heterogeneity, and local vote. While Morgenstern and his colleagues have used the latter two components for the research about party nationalization (Morgenstern and Swindle 2005; Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola 2009), I focus on the first component, i.e., party electoral volatility, in this paper. The volatility score assigned for each observation is a continuous variable with values that range from 0 to âˆž, where higher numbers indicate a higher level of electoral volatility for the party. My primary party-level independent variables are Incumbency, Party age, and Incumbency*Party age. Incumbency is a dichotomous variable, measuring whether a party was the president’s party in two consecutive elections. Following Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), I measure Party age as the natural log of the number of years from the year when the party was officially founded to the year of 2011. The value of this variable does not vary over time, but is constant for all electoral periods for a given party. The interaction term, Incumbency*Party age, examines whether the effect of a party’s age on volatility is contingent on a party’s incumbency status. To test the economic voting hypothesis, I use two economic indicators: GDP growtht1 and Inflationt1.  GDP growtht1 is lagged by one year to capture the short term economic impact on volatility. Inflation rate is operationalized as the logged value of the inflation rate for the year before the election year. The logged inflation rate is used to prevent cases of hyperinflation from skewing the results.  To test whether the effect of the national economy on party volatility is conditional on a party’s incumbency status, I include two interaction terms: Incumbency*GDP growtht1 and Incumbency*Inflationt1. In addition, to test whether a shock of institutional alteration will affect the incumbent party to a greater extent, I include two variables: Institutional discontinuity and Incumbency*Institutional discontinuity. I use the index constructed by Roberts and Wibbels (1999) to measure institutional discontinuity. The index ranges from 0 to 3, assigning one point to each of the following types of discontinuities: the adoption of a new constitution; an increase in voter turnout of more than 25 percent due to the enfranchisement of new voters; and an irregular change in executive authority, including a presidential “self-coup” (autogolpe), a forced resignation of the president, the ouster of the president due to impeachment, or a failed coup d’état attempt when the president was temporarily ousted from the office.  Finally, I control for several party-level and country-level variables in the model. Party size is measured as the vote share of the party in the previous election.  Party system fragmentationt1 is measured as the index of the effective number of parties (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), lagged by one election.  Ethnic Fragmentation is measured as Fearon’s (2003) ethnic fractionalization index. Last, the variable Trend is measured as the number of years since the first election in which a party participated. Estimation Techniques To test the hypotheses about party-level electoral volatility, I employ a hierarchical linear model (HLM) on my three-level data. The three-level model is specified as a level-1 submodel that describes how each party changes over time, a level-2 submodel that describes how these changes differ across parties, and a level-3 model that describes how parties and changes differ across countries. An attractive feature of a multilevel models is its ability to model cross-level interactions in the estimation. Another important advantage of the HLM approach is being able to account for both “fixed effects” and “random effects.” In this study, the fixed-effects coefficients and parameters of the HLM estimate a regression line that describes the sample of parties as a whole, while the random-effect parameters reflect variation across parties and variation across countries. Application of the HLM in this study will specify three different levels of analysis: The level-1 submodel represents the relationship of time-varying characteristics on party volatility, the level-2 model will incorporate party-level effects that are fixed over time, and level-3 will introduce country-level effects that are fixed over time. I estimate the model using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML). In contrast to full MLE estimation, REML takes into account the degrees of freedom consumed by estimation of the fixed effects by eliminating fixed effects from the likelihood fu
Keiser Career College Miami Lakes How Computers Change the Way We Think Essay
LAW 101 SEU Labor Lawsuits Case Study
LAW 101 SEU Labor Lawsuits Case Study.
1.Analyze the cases in the Questions and Problems for:Chapter 2 (4, 5, and 7) in Dynamic Business LawChapter 3 (7 and 9) in Dynamic Business Law2.For each assigned case, analyze the issue based on the following criteria:Identify the parties involved in the case dispute (who is the plaintiff and who is the defendant).Identify the facts associated with the case and fact patterns.Develop the appropriate legal issue(s) in question (i.e., the specific legal issue between the two parties).Provide a judgment on who should win the case – be clear.Support your decision with an appropriate rule of law.3.Be prepared to defend your decision and to objectively evaluate the other points of view.Chapter 24. Jarold Daniel Friedman worked as a temporary computer contractor for a pharmaceutical ware- house. The warehouse offered him a permanent position, but the warchouse required that he get a mumps vaccine, grown in chicken embryos, as a condition of his permanent employment. Friedman a vegan, believed that the vaccination would violate his religious beliefs and declined to be vaccinated. As a result, the warchouse withdrew its offer of employment. Friedman claimed that the warchouse discriminated against him on the basis of religion. Do you agree with Friedman? Do employers have a duty to respect the beliefs of their employees? If so, what happens when that duty conflicts with employers’ duty to provide a safe and healthy work environment? (Friedman Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 102 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2002).5. Jennifer Erickson sued her employer, Bartell Drug Company, contending that its decision not to cover prescription contraceptives under its employee pre- scription drug plan constituted sex discrimination. Bartell argued that its decision was not sex discrim- ination because contraceptives were preventive, were voluntary, and did not treat an illness. With whom do you agree? Why? What values did you use to reach your conclusion? (Erickson Bartell Drug Co, 141 F Supp. 24 1266 (2001)7. Ermest Price went to a doctor in 1997, seeking Oxycontin to treat pain related to sickle cell ane- mia. Between November 1999 and October 2000, Price sought Oxycontin prescriptions from at least ten different doctors at ten different clinics in two cities, filling the prescriptions at seven pharmacies in three cities, The doctors were notified of Price’s medication-secking behavior, and the doctors dis continued Price’s treatment. Price then filed suit. claiming his doctors, pharmacies, and the pharma- ceutical compunies that manufactured Oxycontin had breached their duty by failing to adequately warn Price of the addictive nature of Oxycontin. How do you think the court responded to Price’s claims? Think about all the stakeholders involved in such a case: how would those parties be affected by a ruling in favor of Price? In favor of the doc tors and pharmaceutical companies? (Ernest Price K. The Purdue Pharma Co, 920 So. 2d 479; 2006 Miss. LEXIS 67 (2006)Chapter 37. The plaintiff, a Texas resident, and the defendants, Colorado residents, were cat breeders who met at a cat show in Colorado. Subsequently, the plain- tiff sent two cats to the defendants in Colorado for breeding and sent a third cat to them to be sold. A dispute over the return of the two breed- ing cats arose, and the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in Texas. The defendants alleged that the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they did not have minimum contacts within the state of Texas. The Texas statute provides that the Texas court could exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defen- dant only if (1) the defendant has purposefully estab- lished minimum contacts with the forum state and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with tradi- tional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The defendants were not residents of Texas and had no business in Texas. The only contact the defendants had with Texas was a single trip they made to Texas to pick up two other cats, not related to the litigation, that they were going to take to a cat show. During that same visit, the defendants took a cat unrelated to the lawsuit to see a Texas veterinarian, and the plain- tiff’s husband assisted the defendants with a Web page for their business. The trial court found that sufficient minimum contacts had been established. The defendants appealed. How do you believe the appellate court would rule in this case, and why? IHagan v. Field, Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 393.9. Thirteen record labels filed a copyright violation suit against Hummer Winblad Venture Partners (Hummer), an owner of Napster, a peer-to-peer file- sharing network for online distribution of music. Hummer filed a counterclaim alleging antitrust violations against the record labels because they conspired to exclude independent music distribu- tors like Napster from the online music distribu- tion market. The record labels argued that Hummer lacked standing to make its counterclaims because Hummer, not Napster, made the counterclaims and Hummer never competed directly with the record labels. Hummer, on the other hand, argued that it had standing because it financed Napster, a partici- pant in the online music distribution market. How do you think the court ruled in this case? Why? In re Napster Copyright Linig, v. Hummer Winhlad Venture Partners, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (2005).
LAW 101 SEU Labor Lawsuits Case Study
Assignment 2: Constitutional Rights
online dissertation writing Assignment 2: Constitutional Rights.
Assignment 2: Constitutional RightsDue Week 10 and worth 200 pointsThe constitutional rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are most highly protected during the trial stage of a criminal proceeding. This is when the adversarial process, which characterizes the U.S. criminal justice process, is at its peak. Analyze and evaluate the steps which would bring an individual to trial beginning with the arrest phase of the process.Write a four to six (4-6) page paper in which you:Identify and discuss the four (4) elements of arrest.Identify and discuss the four (4) requirements for search and seizure with a warrant.Explain the various aspects of the plain view doctrine.Compare and contrast the various means of identifying suspects.Summarize the basic constitutional rights of the accused during trial.Use at least four (4) quality references. Note: Wikipedia and other Websites do not qualify as academic resourcesYour assignment must follow these formatting requirements:Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size 12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references must follow APA or school-specific format. Check with your professor for any additional instructions.Include a cover page containing the title of the assignment, the student’s name, the professor’s name, the course title, and the date. The cover page and the reference page are not included in the required assignment page length.
Assignment 2: Constitutional Rights
Cyber Security Case Study
Cyber Security Case Study.
n Chapter 5, the interesting and controversial topic of cyber security is presented. As stated in the course textbook, battling cyber threats is one of the costs of doing business in today’s globally-connected corporate environment. Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks (DDoS), malware infections, and other black-hat hacker generated security breaches have increased in frequency and pose even greater threats to government agencies, military organizations, and corporate enterprises. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Sony, Target, JP Morgan and eBay are just some of the entities that experienced major data breaches in 2015. The greatest theft of medical records ever occurred in 2015 at the health insurers Anthem and Primera. Of great concern and receiving much media attention is that regarding the potential for power-grid cyber attacks, something that would clearly undermine the safety and security of the world’s nations.Written Assignment: Conduct research on a recent threat or attack on a government agency, military organization, or corporate enterprise. Present data that describes the type of threat, the degree of harm caused by the threat, and describe who or what entity the perpetrator(s) might have been that could benefit from such an action. Give details on solutions that might have prevented the exploit and could be utilized to assist in mitigating or eliminating cyber threats in the future.
Cyber Security Case Study
University of Houston Strategic Marketing Plan
University of Houston Strategic Marketing Plan.
Final Strategic Marketing PlanThis assignment wraps up the marketing plan. Basically, you are asked to combine all the material written to date (see attached zip file) into a unified marketing plan using the template provided (see attached ‘template’ file). Cutting-and-pasting past assignments might not be sufficient. It will result in too much repetitiveness. For example, you would probably have a dozen explanations of your product/service throughout the marketing plan. Some editing will be needed. One simple test of the quality of your completed marketing plan…..is it ready to present to a potential investor in my new venture? You’ll find the the required CASE papers, SLP papers, and Discussion Posts in the attached zip file. If you are having trouble opening any of them please let me know AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Each file has the Professor’s feedback that addresses them directly. Please pay attention and correct what is asked in italics. Each of them will need to be addressed in this paper. Use the template provided (see attached file “template”), complete the comprehensive marketing plan for this assignment. Since you have a series of different references lists for each assignment, you will need to combine them for this submission.Please open and read the file ‘Session Long Project notes’ before beginning. I’m attaching the zip file, and you can also retrieve it from this link: https://www.amazon.com/clouddrive/share/kOCxSijGI3…If there are any problems with the zip please let me know and I’ll attach each document individually to this post.ExpectationsUse the attached APA-formatted template (see ‘template’ file) to create your submission.A paper with APA citations (2- to 3-sentence introduction, body, 2- to 3-sentence conclusion)The reference list page in APA formatThe entire paper will vary in length based on what was previously submitted.
University of Houston Strategic Marketing Plan