In law and economics, the Coase Theorem, attributed to Nobel Prize laureate Ronald Coase, describes the economic efficiency of an economic allocation or outcome in the presence of externalities. The theorem states that if trade in an externality is possible and there are no transaction-costs, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. In practice, obstacles to bargaining or poorly defined property rights can prevent Coasian bargaining. The Coase Theorem is commonly understood to mean that costless bargaining ensures efficiency in the economy for any assignment of property rights. The standard demonstration of the theorem suggests that costless bargaining ensures efficiency without an assignment of property rights. ‘If transaction costs are zero, the initial assignment of a property right – for example, whether to the polluter or to the victim of pollution – will not affect the efficiency with which resources are allocated.’ The Coase theorem, as stated by Richard Posner Nowhere in the essay ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Coase, 1960) does R. H. Coase mention any sort of objective theorem as to Coase theorem, which commentators and other economists have professed to observe. From that perspective it can be said that it is the only theorem with quite a famous and imposing presence, but without any objectively recognised content. Robert Cooter in his paper ‘Coase Theorem’ (Eatwell et al.), have put forward his observance with regard to ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ that the theorem is ‘false or a tautology’. I have tried to cover some minutely different reasons than those of Robert Cooter, in expounding the same idea that ‘Coase Theorem’ can prove to be a failure if established its tautological approach. Cooter concedes bargaining as an act of negotiation and he states that even if negotiations may be costless, it is not necessary that bargaining will be achieved. In this paper bargaining is interpreted as a successful striking of deal, and therefore a mere negotiation without any fruition of agreement has a burden of transaction cost, which can be perceived from the wastage of the surplus over which the negotiation takes place. Therefore, also failure to agree is itself can be regarded as a transaction cost. Without going into much distinction with Cooter’s arguments, this paper would try: to show that the Coase theorem is a very questionable entity, and to clarify the inextricable connection between price-taking and bargaining, one determinate within economic analysis, the other not. As words of Posner (above mentioned) are widely accepted with regard to Coase Theorem, to put light on the same statement, Coase theorem is doubly ambiguous. In the statement the words ‘will not affect’ are open to two distinct meanings with entirely different implications about property rights, and the term ‘transaction cost’ conceals a fundamental assumption about bargaining. These ambiguities will be considered in turn. The form of the theorem is ‘If A, then B’, where the antecedent is A: ‘that transactions cost are zero’, and the consequent is B: ‘that the initial assignment of a property right will not affect the efficiency with which resources are allocated’. The statement B is open to two interpretations. It may be interpreted as B1: ‘regardless of how law assigns property rights it will not affect economic efficiency with which resources are allocated, any assignment of property rights gives rise to an efficient allocation of resources, on the understanding that efficiency requires some assignment of property rights’, Or, it may be interpreted as B2: ‘it doesn’t matter if there are assignments of property rights or not, resources would be allocated efficiently’. This distinction between two meanings of a same statement has fundamental implications on economics and law which depend on applications of the Theorem. The statements B1 and B2 are mutually exclusive; they cannot both be correct. Understood as ‘If A, then B1’, the Coase Theorem imply that, in the absence of operation cost, a clear demarcation of property rights is a compulsory and (subject to well-known recommendation not relevant here) adequate condition for effectiveness in the economy, though any distribution of property to people will do as well as any other. Interpreted as ‘If A, then B2’, the Coase theorem implies that, in the absence of operation cost, property rights are unnecessary because people haggle their way to effectiveness in the economy regardless. In the latter interpretation, haggling becomes a ideal alternative for property and the price system. Clearly, it is the idea ‘If A, then B1’ that is expressed in Posner’s account of the Coase theorem. It turns out, however, that the idea ‘if A, then B1’ is, strictly speaking, false, while the idea ‘If A, then B2’ is true but wholly false and almost tautological. To establish these claims, I turn to Coase’s famous example of the farmer and the cowboy. Coase constructs this example in terms of marginal revenue and marginal cost. While not wrong, the construction is inexpedient and perhaps misleading. The example is reconstructed here with the aid of a production possibility frontier from which the appropriate marginal curves could, but will not be, derived. Recall the example. The cowboy’s ranch is situated beside the farmer’s farm. If unattended, cows from the ranch graze on the farm, destroying crops. The destruction of crops is costly. It is also costly to restrain the cows. Costs of crop damage and of restraining cows are both functions of the number of cows that wander onto the farmer’s field. Incomes of both parties are determined accordingly. The income of the farmer is maximized when there are no cows in his field. The income of the cowboy is maximized when there are four cows in the farmer’s field. The value of production – the sum of the income of the cowboy and the income of the farmer – is maximized when there are two cows in the farmer’s field. The incomes of the farmer and the cowboy are illustrated on Fig. 1, with the income of the farmer, F, on the vertical axis and the income of the cowboy, C, on the horizontal axis. Each of the five numbered points on the figure shows the earnings of the farmer and the cowboy as determined by the number of cows that graze on the farmer’s land. The points labelled 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the incomes Figure . Income of the farmer (F ) and income of the cowboy (C ) depending on the number of cows in the farmer’s field. of the farmer and the cowboy when there are no cows in the farmer’s field, one cow, two cows, three cows and four cows respectively. With no cows in the farmer’s land, the farmer’s income is F0 as indicated on the vertical axis, and the cowboy’s income is C0 as indicated on the horizontal axis. With some cows in the farmer’s field, the incomes of the farmer and the cowboy are indicated accordingly. It would not be inconsistent with the diagram if farming were no longer profitable with as many as four cows on the farmer’s field; in that case F4 would be the farmer’s best alternative after giving up farming altogether. Together, the set of points 01234 is the production possibility frontier for the farmer and the cowboy when outputs are measured in dollars’ worth. Their combined income corresponding to any point on the production possibility frontier is the intersection with the vertical axis or the horizontal axis of a line through that point at 45° to both axes. The efficient point on the production possibility frontier is that for which the combined income is as large as possible. It is immediately evident from the figure that the efficient point is 2 with two cows in the farmer’s field and incomes to farmer and cowboy of F2 and C2. The line DJ – at 458 to both axes – is the locus of all possible apportionments between the farmer and the cowboy of their total income at the efficient number of cows in the farmer’s field. Necessarily, the maximal combined income is QD = QJ = F2 C2 …. …. (1) The gap between ‘the actual combined income of the farmer and the cowboy for any number of cows permitted to graze on the farmer’s field’ and the ‘maximal potential combined income’ (when two cows graze there) can be measured as the vertical distance below the line DJ of the indicator of the incomes of farmer and cowboy with the initial allocation of property rights and in the event that the cowboy is not persuaded or bribed to graze fewer cows on the farmer’s land than the law allows. The potential gain from cooperation is E0 when the initial allocation is at 0, and is G4 when the initial allocation is at 4. Coase makes the valid argument that, with costless bargaining, the efficient output is attained no matter what the initial assignment of property rights. Suppose the farmer has the absolute right to stop cows from grazing on his land. Without the farmer’s permission, no cows may graze there. By forbidding grazing altogether the farmer can earn F0 and the corresponding income of the cowboy is C0. But it would be disadvantageous for the farmer to exercise that right completely. Instead, the farmer sells the cowboy the right to graze two cows on the farmer’s land, raising their combined income from F0 C0 to F2 C2, and generating a surplus S0 S0(F2 C2) – (F0 C0) = E0 …. …. (2) which is divided between them in accordance with the price they set. Farmer and cowboy both become better off as long as the price paid by the cowboy to the farmer is greater than F0 – F2, at which the entire surplus accrues to the cowboy, and less than C2 – C0 , at which the entire surplus 20 accrues to the farmer. Farmer and cowboy divide the surplus by choosing a payment from among the set of feasible payments for which both parties are better off than if there were no deal at all. To say that bargaining is costless is to say that there is no loss of resources or time when a price within the feasible range is chosen. Their post-bargain incomes are Fα and Cα where Fα = F0 αS0 and Cα = C0 (1 – α)S0 …. …. (3) and where α is the mutually-agreed upon farmer’s share of the surplus from the bargain. Necessarily, 0 < α < 1. The farmer gets the entire surplus if α = 1. The cowboy gets the entire surplus if α = 0. Farmer and cowboy are presumed to agree on some α between these limits, but nothing in economic theory enables one to predict where within these limits the agreed-upon α will be. The initial allocation of rights sets bounds on the final allocation of income, but does not determine it uniquely. The set of possible incomes of the farmer in all of the mutually-advantageous bargains is represented by points on the line OE above the allocation in the initial assignment of property rights. One cannot say a priori which point within that range will be agreed upon. Similarly, if the cowboy has the property right to graze as many cows as he pleases on the farmer’s land, he could, by exercising that right to the full, earn an income of C4 , leaving the farmer with an income of only F4 . Once again, it is in the interest of the party with the property right in grazing to sell part of that right because it is worth more to the other party than it is to him. The cowboy sells the farmer the right to have no more than two cows grazing on his land. The surplus is now S4 where, as is evident from the figure, S4 = (F2 C2) – (F4 C4) = G4 …. …. (4) As the figure is drawn, S4 < S0 indicating that the surplus from the bargain is less than it was before. Now the payment – this time from the farmer to the cowboy – must lie within the range from F2 – F4, at which the entire surplus accrues to the cowboy, to C4 – C2, at which the entire surplus accrues to the farmer. One way or another and regardless of the initial allocation of rights, the farmer and the cowboy agree to produce efficiently and to an allocate of the maximal combined income as represented by some point on the line DJ. The moral Coase draws from the story is that, with costless bargaining, the efficient output is attained regardless of who has the initial assignment of rights. The total value of production is maximized in either case. Only the distribution of income is affected by the initial assignment of rights. The cowboy gets the larger share of total income when he has the initial property right to graze cows on the farmer’s land. The farmer gets the larger share of total income when he has the initial property right to forbid grazing on his land. In either case, there is a surplus to be allocated by bargaining. What appears not to have been recognized is that the argument proves too much. The argument is a demonstration of the proposition ‘if A, then B’, as A and B are defined at the outset of this paper. Interpreting the statement B in the sense of B1, the proposition might be looked upon as a lesson about how property rights promote efficiency in the economy. But the proposition ‘If A, then B1’ turns out to be completely false. Property rights are unnecessary in this context. Accept the premise of costless bargaining, and an efficient output can be attained not just for any initial allocation of property rights, but without property rights at all! What looks at first as a demonstration of the proposition ‘If A, then B1’ is in reality a demonstration of the proposition ‘If A, then B2’. To appreciate the irrelevance of property rights when bargaining is altogether costless, imagine what would happen if the cowboy and farmer find themselves side by side with no property rights assigned. Do they fight? Perhaps. Regardless, something must happen, and whatever that something is or whatever the uncertainty about the eventual outcome, there must for both parties be a distribution of possible outcomes with certainty equivalent incomes represented, for the cowboy, by the point CA in the figure and, for the farmer, by the FA. Together, these certainty equivalent incomes are represented on the figure by the point A, which is mnemonic for anarchy. To speak of the expected incomes of the farmer and the cowboy in the absence of property rights is not to deny that the lives of the farmer and the cowboy in these conditions would be solitary, poor nasty, brutish and short. The point A is placed close to the origin to suggest precisely that possibility. But, however badly off the farmer and the cowboy may be in conditions of anarchy, there must be some pair of incomes FA and CA, such that the parties would be as well off with those incomes held securely as they would expect to be in conditions of anarchy. Think of those incomes as the certainty equivalents of expected incomes net of the cost of conflict between farmer and cowboy when property rights are insecure and it is not known in advance which party will prevail. Once again, the assumption that farmer and cowboy can bargain costlessly implies that two cows will be allowed to graze in the farmer’s field, yielding an efficient outcome at the point 2 where their incomes would be F2 and C2 if there were no side payments. The surplus in the bargain becomes SA where SA = (F2 C2)-(FA CA) = AH …. …. (5) which must somehow be allocated between farmer and cowboy if the efficient outcome is to be attained. With costless bargaining, an allocation of the surplus is agreed upon and the value of production is maximized. The difference between this case and the preceding cases is one of magnitude not of kind. The proof that efficiency is attained in the absence of property rights is qualitatively identical to the proof that efficiency is attained regardless of how property rights are assigned. If one of these propositions is valid, then the other must be valid too. Furthermore, though the proof of this assertion is constructed for two parties only, the logic of the proof remains valid when the number of parties is increased without limit. In a wide variety of circumstances, costless bargaining renders property, and the price mechanism, unnecessary. Returning to the interpretation of the Coase theorem, the example demonstrates the proposition ‘If A, then B1’ to be false and the proposition ‘If A, then B2’ to be true. With costless bargaining, there is no need for property rights. But, if the proposition ‘If A, then B ‘ is what the Coase theorem is supposed to mean, then the theorem as stated is grossly, almost ludicrously, misleading. Recall the wording of B in the original statement of the theorem: ‘that the initial assignment of a property right will not affect the efficiency with which resources are allocated’. Reading that, one would not infer that property rights are irrelevant for efficiency. If ‘If A, then B2’ is what is meant, the original version of the Coase theorem is like the statement, ‘In the present state of medical technology, painting of fire engines blue rather than red will not change the fact that all men are mortal’. Strictly speaking, that is true, but the statement carries the implication that the painting of fire engines and the mortality of mankind are somehow connected, that, perhaps, men would become immortal if fire engines were not painted at all. As enunciated by Posner, the Coase theorem is incoherent in that it suggests one thing and means another which is almost the opposite. The other ambiguity in the statement of the Coase theorem – that the term ‘transaction cost’ is ambiguous – can now be discussed briefly. The word ‘cost’ bears the implication that one can acquire something for a price. A car may cost $30 000. A building may cost $30 000 000. To speak of cost normally implies a well-defined number of dollars, or of some commodity, that must be given up to acquire something else. Transaction cost is not like that. The term is used in the context of bargaining problems where a surplus is to be allocated between parties if and only if they can agree upon shares. Suppose the farmer has the right to exclude all cows from his land and, as indicated in Fig. 1, there is a surplus of GE to be shared between the farmer and the cowboy. A transaction cost would be like an ordinary cost if there were a well-specified mechanism causing total output to fall by some given proportion of GE as a consequence of the bargaining procedure. That is precisely what is absent in this context. Resources may well be used up in bargaining, but there is no telling in advance what the value of those resources will be. Men may kill one another over trifles, or may allocate huge amounts by a simple offer and acceptance. There is in practice no simple one-to-one relation between the magnitude of the surplus over which people bargain and the resources used up in deal-making. There is no rational procedure, comparable the price mechanism in competitive markets, for allocating surplus between interested parties. Surpluses do get allocated, but the process by which they are allocated is, for the economist, fundamentally mysterious. There are plenty of solutions to the bargaining problem, but, to the best of my knowledge, every solution is obtained by adding structure to the crude bargaining problem as set out in the text. For instance, the Nash Bargaining solution is obtained by maximizing the product of utilities, and the Rubinstein bargaining solution is obtained by imposing a sequence of offers and rejections together with a postulated shrinking of the pie over time. See Osborne and Rubinstein. Talk of transactions cost is, in my opinion, the adoption or imposition of a rule of thumb which is not unreasonable in itself but should be recognized as such. The rule of thumb is that a cost of bargaining exists and is a well-defined function of the surplus to be divided. The rule is that the cost of bargaining B, is an increasing and convex function, ƒ, of the surplus S, B = ƒ(S) …. …. (6) where ƒ’ > 0 and ƒ” > 0. To complete the story, there is usually added an assumption about how the surplus net of transaction cost is apportioned between the parties to the bargain. For example, if the initial allocation of property rights is that the farmer may deny all grazing of cows on his land, if the cost of bargaining is ƒ(S) = (0.1)S2 where S is the surplus from the bargain, if S=OE in Fig. 1 and if the residual surplus is divided equally between farmer and cowboy, then the bargain will be such that the farmer’s income becomes F0 OE[1-(0.1)(OE)2]/2 and the cowboy’s income becomes C0 OE[1-(0.1)(OE)2]/2, as long as OE[1-(0.1)(OE)2]/2 is positive. To repeat: There is no denying that bargaining problems are frequently resolved in practice. To look upon bargaining as a well-defined transaction cost is a useful rule of thumb. The rule is ungrounded in any general specification of rational self-seeking behaviour. Some concluding observations: (1) That resources will be employed efficiently in the absence of transaction cost is almost a tautology. What does it mean to say that transaction costs are zero? It means that people can bargain costlessly, and will, presumably, do so as long as bargains are mutually advantageous. But the absence of mutually-advantageous bargains is precisely what one means by efficiency, a state of affairs such that no change can make one person better off without making somebody else worse off. The strictly-correct version of the Coase theorem boils down to the proposition if people can agree upon an efficient outcome, then there will be an efficient outcome. (2) I have no quarrel with Ellickson’s defence of Coase (Ellickson, 1991) that ‘The essence of Coase’s argument…is that transaction costs are large and that economic actors arrange their institutions with an eye to these costs.’ My only reservations are about the ambiguity in the concept of transaction cost and that there is no room within that defence for anything that might reasonably be called the Coase theorem. (3) A distinction can be drawn between price-taking and deal-making. One way or another, resources must be moved from those who have them to those who can make the best use of them. Savings must somehow be transformed into investment. Tomatoes must pass from the farmer who grows them to the people who wish to eat them. The skill of the computer programmer must be placed at the disposal of the bank seeking to automate its services. The price mechanism is the ideal moving van if and in so far as people are price-takers, that is, if products are standardized (as one of a number of well-specified commodities) and everyone acts as though he believed he could buy or sell any amount of a commodity without affecting its price. The core propositions in the theory of general equilibrium are that (i) price-taking behaviour generates equilibrium where everything for sale is purchased, and (ii) the equilibrium is efficient in the sense that no reallocation of goods or factors of productions could make anybody better off without making somebody else worse off. Universal price-taking is a reasonable assumption for an economy with well-defined goods and many traders in every market, so that nobody, all by himself, can affect any market significantly. But price-taking is not universal. The market may not discover the equilibrium prices. Goods may not be standardized. Businesses are unique, and participants with different skills must cooperate in circumstances where market prices cannot be identified for all transactions. Neighbours’ interests are directly opposed over the range of permissible uses of property. All too frequently, actors in the market confront one another in actual (as distinct from what economists call perfect) competition, where ones’s income depends on how shrewdly he conducts himself in face-to-face negotiation with other people. In most formulations, the theory of general equilibrium is about how prices guide production and distribution efficiently once property rights are established. By contrast, a world with costless bargaining has no need of either property or prices. An essential difference between price-taking and deal-making should be recognized. Both, if they work as they should, yield outcomes that are Pareto optimal, outcomes such that no change can make some people better without making others worse off. The difference is that, with minor exceptions which do not concern us here, the outcome of price taking is unique, while the outcome of deal-making is not. For any given assignment of resources to people, price-taking leads to one and only one outcome, while deal-making leads to one out of an infinite number of possible Pareto optimal outcomes, with no basis for predicting which outcome that will be. The point is well-known, but is worth restating here. (4) The two-person model in this paper tends to conceal an important aspect of property rights. Property facilitates bargaining by restricting the number of participants to the bargain. An implicit assumption in this paper, as in Coase’s original telling of the story of the farmer and cowboy, is that bargaining is between the farmer and cowboy alone. Nobody else gets to participate. With no property rights, the butcher, the baker and the candlestick-maker would all demand a share not just of the surplus, but of the total income from farming and cattle raising together; and, with costless bargaining, their demands could somehow be accommodated with no loss of output at all. If bargaining were really and truly costless, the entire population of the world would cooperate to maximize world income which would then somehow be shared amicably, in a great reductio ad absurdum of the major premise of the Coase theorem. It is because bargaining is never costless and because the difficulties of bargaining increase with the number of parties involved that economies must rely primarily upon pricing and upon command. The world’s work gets done through prices, with bargaining at the edges where property rights conflict or unique resources have to be combined in a common enterprise. (5) Both versions of the Coase theorem – ‘If A, then B1’ and ‘If A, then B2’ – require that agreements, once reached, will be respected, either because the parties to the agreement are trustworthy or because agreements are enforced by the state. In the latter case, it would be odd if a government prepared to enforce private contracts was not also prepared to establish property rights, but the contrary is imaginable if not realistic. Settlers occupy a territory without prior property rights, and the government stands ready to enforce whatever rights to property and whatever contracts the settlers establish among themselves. Interpreted as a general reminder that the economy runs on a mixture of price-taking and deal-making and that bargaining is no free good, the Coase theorem is instructive but misnamed as a theorem. Interpreted to mean that costless bargaining promotes efficiency in the economy, the Coase theorem is a tautology, for a bargain among rational people must make each person better off than he was before and, with costless bargaining, self-interested people bargain again and again until no mutually-advantageous bargain remains. Interpreted as implying that efficiency in the economy requires an allocation of property to people, even when bargaining is costless, the Coase theorem is incoherent or wrong.
Oakwood University Wk 6 Strategic Leadership Strategy Term Project Portfolio
Oakwood University Wk 6 Strategic Leadership Strategy Term Project Portfolio.
I’m working on a business case study and need an explanation to help me learn.
This week, we will look at the business model your selected company uses and analyze its business-level strategy to see if it is appropriate for the strategic position. If your firm is a large multi-business entity, you will need to choose one of the major businesses (strategic business unit, or SBU) of the firm for this analysis. In prior chapters, you collected information about this firm’s external environment and some of its internal competitive advantages. Using this information and any other you have gathered, address the following questions.See a description and overview for the Case Project Weekly Updates and the Strategy Term Project Portfolio due by Week Eight.For this module, complete or answer the following:1. Does your selected business have differentiated products or services? If so, what is the basis for this differentiation from the competition?2. Does your firm have a cost-leadership position in this business? If so, can you identify which cost drivers it uses effectively to hold this position?3. What is your firm’s approach to the market? If it segments the market, identify the scope of competition it is using.4. Using the answers to the preceding questions, identify which generic business strategies your firm is employing. Is the firm leveraging the appropriate value and cost drivers for the business strategy you identified? Explain why or why not.5. As noted in the chapter, each business strategy is context-dependent. What do you see as positives and negatives with the selected business strategy of your firm in its competitive situation?6. What suggestions do you have to improve the firm’s business strategy and strategic position?7. Create a strategy canvas for your firm. Set on the horizontal axis an appropriate selection of the value curve items and on the vertical axis, set the other industry segments (such as strategic groups) for comparison.Paper Details:Submit the assignment in Microsoft Office format.Format the assignment using APA formatting and writing style. General Expectations for All Written Assignments: Papers should follow current APA guidelines in terms of type, margins, and citations and address the following areas: 1. The actual assignment topic. Consult the instructor for additional information or clarity on assignment instructions.2. Cover the assignment topic in sufficient detail and depth with scholarly sources to support claims.3. The content should reflect ample use of required readings and other course materials.4. A Running Case Project Rubric will be used for grading this assignment.
Oakwood University Wk 6 Strategic Leadership Strategy Term Project Portfolio
RUC British American Geopolitical Strategies in The Middle East Essay
programming assignment help RUC British American Geopolitical Strategies in The Middle East Essay.
British-American geopolitical strategies in the Middle East, and it’s impact on Saudi-Iranian relationships. Researcher should follow these: 1. Abstract. 2. Introduction.
3. Apply ( Neorealism, or structural realism theoretical framework.
Mearsheimer), please clarify this (How and why neorealist theoretical
framework is adapted and adopted to the context of research). How to
apply it? 4. Use verbs for citations in each source that
will be used. Like Y argues that, Y points out that, Y states that
etc… and link words. 5. Use UK style and structure. 6. Indicate the importance of this research and it’s aims and questions. 7. Use MHRA style. 8. Use 24 appropriate and recent sources. 9. Bibliography should be divided to primary sources and secondary sources.
RUC British American Geopolitical Strategies in The Middle East Essay
Cause and Effect Essay
Cause and Effect Essay. I’m trying to learn for my English class and I’m stuck. Can you help?
In a cause and effect analysis, you discover why something happened / changed (cause) and what results it produced (effects). In other words, “cause” refers to events that have occurred, and “effect” refers to consequences that will occur. Any subject, from why the stock market fell on a particular day to what can be learned from a set of statistics, will have multiple causes and effects. This interrelationship makes a particular subject interesting, but managing the subject effectively requires sorting minor or remote causes from the major causes and effects to be analyzed. Also, you need to decide which part of the process seems most significant – the causes or the effects. Do you want to explain why the stock market fell or analyze what happened when the statistics were studied?
Readers are generally curious about why something happens and what results it produces. But, they expect you to show them the connection of how the causal relationship works and not to simply list causes or points to effects. Consider, then, 1) what context readers need to help them see the significance of the subject and 2) how much and what kind of evidence they need to accept your assertion about the connection between the causes and effects you describe. Topics which are not acceptable are global warming and medical (or any type of) marijuana. Paper 4 must be written entirely in Objective 3rd Person using no First Person or Second Person.
A cause and effect analysis likely has one of three purposes. First, it is written to argue that a certain relationship exists between one set of events and another. Arguing that the consumption of alcohol causes heart disease requires acknowledging the possibility of other causal relationships before presenting your best evidence for the relationship you consider the most probable. Second, it is written to explain how and why things happen. Trying to explain how to establish the price of a product or how a budget was exceeded is an attempt to isolate specific causes and effects, but must acknowledge possible outside influences. Third, it is written to speculate about the possible causes or potential effects of a certain chain of events. If speculating about a new style in fashion, the purpose is to theorize, to expand the range of possible causes and consequences.
Likewise, a cause and effect essay can be organized in three ways: 1) state a cause and then discuss its effects, 2) state an effect and then discuss its causes, or 3) identify a chain of causes and events. Regardless of organizational pattern, be sure to state your claim early, clearly explain the connection you are attempting to demonstrate, and clearly present the evidence for connections you intend to analyze. Whether you decide to emphasize causes or effects, you will discover that the motion of life makes your starting point somewhat arbitrary. All causes have effects, which, in turn, become causes.
Following “The Elements of Argument” in Practical Argument Chapter 1 (pp. 24 – 27), an outline along these lines could be used for this assignment.
I) Introduction – explicitly state what your cause and effect topic is, give any brief and relevant
background information, and explicitly state the argument that you intend to make about it;
show readers how your discussion will be structured by stating the main points found in your
research (ideally 3) that support your position that you will develop in the Body
II) Body – explicate the three (3) main points listed in the Introduction that support your
position on the topic fully and clearly, adjusting your discussion for paper length (you may
use more than one paragraph for each main point); cite at least two (2) sources which
support your position; remember to adjust your discussion to the paper length
III) Refutation – remember that objections come in two forms: 1) most importantly, those
directed against the reasons in support of your thesis (e.g. your assumptions are implausible
or your logical reasoning is unsatisfactory) and 2) those directed against your conclusion
(e.g. reasons why the view you advocate is false); cite at least one (1) source which opposes
IV) Conclusion – restate your thesis in different words so that it reinforces your interpretation
Additionally, an effective cause and effect essay avoids the following Logical Fallacies (PA pp. 147 – 159 and AWR pp. 79 – 86):
1) Exaggerated claim. Many plausible cause-and-effect relationships are complex situations
difficult to prove conclusively, so present your analysis as a possible explanation rather than the
2) Hasty generalization. Important events seldom result from one simple cause, and rarely
produce one simple effect. Thus, qualify your assertions with phrases such as “a major
cause,” “one result,” or “an immediate effect.”
3) Circular Reasoning. Do not chase your own tail by analyzing effects imbedded in the cause,
e.g., “There weren’t enough concert tickets because there were too many people in line.”
4) Mistaking Chronology for Causation. Do not assume that, just because one event followed
another, the first necessarily caused the second.
5) Slippery Slope. Be careful arguing that one event will automatically lead to a chain of other
events. Often, this type of analysis can be emotionally based (i.e. biased), and it requires all
available data for informed decisions.
Obviously, cause and effect analysis can be tricky. But, you should not avoid it until you are absolutely sure of your information, since you cannot always wait to analyze or forecast. The best you can do is observe carefully, speculate intelligently based on available data, and, when appropriate, qualify your analysis thoroughly.
For Paper 4, use at least three (3) sources, two supporting your position on the topic and one opposing it (no more than five  sources in any event); these sources may be accessed electronically or in print. You will need to document the sources just like you did in Paper 3. The two supporting articles could provide either main topics for you to discuss in the body of the paper or important information for the body paragraphs, while the opposing one will help you consider objections to your position by providing one example. Correctly cite each source parenthetically in the text, and include a correctly formatted MLA 8 Works Cited page. See PA Ch. 10 (pp. 345 – 367), AWR (pp. 427 – 468), and the MLA 8 Guide from Norton PDF on Canvas for correct in-text citation and bibliographic forms.
Cause and Effect Essay
Group work evaluation Essay
For the work on the project, our class was subdivided into groups. We needed to work in groups during the semester; therefore, the proper distribution of students into members was extremely important. I was lucky to appear in the group of my good friends. That is why, working in team with them was easy and interesting for me. I knew every member of my group before the project, and this made it easier for me to communicate with them. Knowing the personal qualities of every individual allowed us organize the work properly. Specifically, we managed to distribute the tasks among the group members in a way that guaranteed the sufficiency and competency of every individual. Every member of the group was responsible for some task and its performance. All the members managed to do their tasks on time, and there were no disagreement with any of the members. At the beginning of the work on the project, I expected the work to be rather complicated. Namely, I had assumed that it would be hard for several group members to cooperate. In fact, I had doubts about the team project to be successful. I thought that it would have been better and more comfortable for me to work on the project on my own. It was also hard for me to trust the other members, and let them be responsible for some tasks. However, with the flow of the work my vision of the project changed. The team project appeared to be a very interesting and educational type of activity. What is more, the group project contributed to my general understanding of the subject. As far as the responsibilities were distributed among the members of the team, it was easier for me to analyze every level of the subject. Group project allowed me doing the research step by step, learning its separate parts, and then analyzing the project as a whole. In comparison with other activities group project proved to be harder to do, but in some cases it was even more helpful. Now I can confidently claim that the process of learning would have been incomplete without the group project. One more advantage of the group project is that it involved interaction with the other group members. Such activity developed my communicative skills, teached me how to express myself clearly and understand others better. Get your 100% original paper on any topic done in as little as 3 hours Learn More Furthermore, work in team developed the sense of responsibility in every of the members, as the task of each individual was not only doing his or her own task, but also contributing to the group work. Failing to do the task on time meant not only personal failure, but also letting down of the whole team. I feel that the experience of doing a group project changed my attitude to doing tasks in general, and to the process of learning. Working on team project was a new kind of activity for me. However, despite the fact that it proved to be very interesting and useful, it is hard for me to decide whether it is the best of the course activities. I guess that team project is a good kind of work, but it cannot be used alone. Indeed, the textbooks are irreplaceable; they were also helpful in the project. The exercises that we did in the class were very interesting, and they helped to understand the material better. In addition, while the flow of the project was managed by us, the exercises in class were controlled by the teacher, which guaranteed our adequacy. The films shown in class were also rather helpful, especially for those students, who have a good visual memory. I think that every kind of activity is extremely useful, and all of them need to be used in complex for maximal effect.